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Yet despite the importance of the fair use defense, and despite the enormous
amount of scholarly attention that it has received, we continue to lack any sys-
tematic, comprehensive account of our fair use case law and the actual state of
our fair use doctrine. Instead, our conventional wisdom derives from a small
set of conventionally agreed-upon leading cases. This Article presents the re-
sults of the first empirical study bf our fair use case law to show that much of
our conventional wisdom about that case law is mistaken. Working from a
data set consisting of all reported federal opinions that made substantial use of
the section 107 four-factor test for fair use through 2005, the Article shows
which factors and subfactors actually drive the outcome of the fair use test in
practice, how the fair use factors interact, how courts inflect certain individual
factors, and the extent to which judges stampede the factor outcomes to conform
to the overall test outcome. It also presents empirical evidence of the extent to
which lower courts either deliberately ignored or were ignorant of fair use doc-
trine set forth in the leading cases, particularly those from the Supreme Court.
Based on these descriptive findings, the Article prescribes a set of doctrinal prac-
tices that will improve courts'adjudication of the fair use defense.
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INTRODUCTION
Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976 establishes the affirma-
tive defense to copyright infringement of "fair use."' This affirmative
defense represents the most important-and amorphous-limitation
on the otherwise extraordinarily broad rights granted to copyright
owners under section 106 of the Act. 2 Much of our economic and
communicative action would constitute infringement of those rights
but for the defense of fair use. It is the ill-defined and unpredictable
point of flexibility, the "dangerous supplement,, 3 that makes the rest
4of our copyright law possible-and bearable. Section 107 offers no
definition of "fair use," and none is offered elsewhere in the Act. The
section does, however, enumerate four broadly worded factors that
courts "shall" consider in determining whether a use is "fair" and thus
noninfringing:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the
Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, 2546 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§ 107 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).
2 Id. (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).
3 See JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 141-64 (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
trans. 1976) (describing a "dangerous supplement" as, among other things, an area of
deconstructive ambiguity and ambivalence in a theoretical edifice that threatens always
to undermine the foundations of that edifice).
4 Cf R. Polk Wagner, The Perfect Storm: Intellectual Property and Public Values, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 423, 431 (2005) (noting that the uncertainty surrounding the fair
use doctrine "has the potential to erode the foundations of fair use-and with it much
of the social benefit of the copyright law").
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portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
For better or worse, these factors form the core of our fair use doc-
trine and functionally define what fair use is. For all of the ambiguity
of their statutory language, they are what stand between us and what
some have called, with only a touch of hyperbole, the "tyranny of
copyright."
6
Section 107, and the concept of fair use more generally, have at-
tracted an enormous amount of scholarly attention, ranging from
broad social-theoretical treatments7 to precise analyses of the leading
cases and their impact." Nearly all of this commentary has been
highly critical of section 107's four-factor test and how courts have ap-
plied it. Yet, remarkably, we continue to lack any systematic, com-
5 17 U.S.C. § 107.
6 See, e.g., Robert S. Boynton, The Tyranny of Copyright?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 40; see also Yochai Benkler, Free As the Air to Common Use: First
Amendment Constrairts on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 357-58
(1999) (noting that the "enclosure" that reuslits from strict copyright resrtictions con-
flicts with the purpose of the First Amendment, which "requires a robust public do-
main"); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Do-
main, 66 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter-Spring 2003, 33, 37-40 (lamenting the
emergence of a "second enclosure movement" that seeks to challenge the "baseline"
rule that "intellectual property rights are the exception rather than the norm").
7 See, e.g., William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1659 (1988); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Eco-
nomic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982);
Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775 (2003); MichaelJ. Madison, A
Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525 (2004).
8 See, e.g., Jessica Litman, The Sony Paradox, 55 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 917 (2005);
Frank Pasquale, Breaking the Vicious Circularity: Sony 's Contribution to the Fair Use Doc-
trine, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 777 (2005); Pamela Samuelson, The Generativity of Sony v.
Universal: The Intellectual Property Legacy of Justice Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1831
(2006); Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Unwinding Sony (U.C. Berkeley Pub. Law &
Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 930728), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=930728; see also infta note 64 (discussing the annual ratio of
law review articles addressing fair use to actual federal court cases doing the same dur-
ing the period sampled).
9 See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX (rev. ed. 2003); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 115 (2003) (pointing out the
particular deficiencies of each of the four statutory factors); Michael W. Carroll, Fixing
Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1106 (2007) ("[L]eading courts and commentators gen-
erally acknowledge that the four-factor test as interpreted provides very little guidance
for predicting whether a particular use will be deemed fair."); Madison, supra note 7, at
1564 ("[T]he facial emptiness of the statutory language means that alone, it is almost
entirely useless analytically, except to the extent that it structures the collection of evi-
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prehensive account of our fair use case law.' ° Instead, like the "great
men" approach to history, we pursue a "leading cases" (or "usual
suspects") approach to fair use. This anecdotal method, one essen-
tially of connoisseurship, derives conventional wisdom about our case
law from a limited aristocracy of hand-picked opinions appearing
primarily in the U.S. Reports-or in the student casebooks.1
2
Whether these opinions have any influence on or are representative
of the true state of our fair use doctrine as it is practiced in the courts
remains an open, and strangely unasked, question.
dence that a court might think relevant to its decision."); id. at 1586-87 ("[A]cross a
range of fair use cases, the Supreme Court's formal jurisprudence has encouraged the
courts of appeals, and presumably the district courts following their lead, to abstract
the fair use inquiry to the point of incoherence."); Matthew Sag, God in the Machine: A
New Structural Analysis of Copyrights Fair Use Doctrine, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L.
REV. 381, 434 (2005) (referring to section 107 as a "vague and open-ended standard").
But see William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit, Presumptions,
and Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667, 667-68 (1993) ("The thorniness of fair
use is not due to any failure on the part of the legislature or the judiciary. To the con-
trary, it is inherent in the common law nature of the doctrine as a multifaceted process
by which courts can finely calibrate not only the equities between the parties in a given
case, but also the fundamental public policies at stake in drawing the line between pri-
vate property and free use."); Abraham Drassinower, Authorship as Public Address: On
the Specificity of Copyright Vis-h-Vis Patent and Trade-Mark (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
10 Cf Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Games Economists Play, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1821,
1825 (2000) ("Phenomena that generate data, like collective rights organizations, are
amply studied; amorphous doctrines, such as fair use, which have enormous legal sig-
nificance but little by way of hard facts, do not receive as much attention from pure
economists." (footnotes omitted)).
11 See, e.g., THOMAS CARLYLE, ON HEROES, HERO-WORSHIP AND THE HEROIC IN
HISTORY 29 (Carl Niemeyer ed., Univ. of Neb. Press 1966) (1897) ("The History of the
world is but the Biography of great men.").
12 We currently have one study of a cross-sectional sample of fair use opinions. See
David Nimmer, "Fairest of Them All"and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW& CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter-Spring 2003, at 263, 279-81 (concluding that in resolving fair use cases,
courts first decide whether the use is fair or unfair and then align the four factors to
best support that result). Nimmer studied sixty fair use opinions published in the Fed-
eral Supplement or the Federal Reports between the March 7, 1994, opinion date of
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994), and the February 6, 2002, opin-
ion date of Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2002). As Nimmer admits,
his method was idiosyncratic. He read the facts stated in the opinions and then, based
on those facts, decided for himself which party he thought each factor should favor.
He then compared his own factor-specific findings to the overall finding of the court
on the fair use question. See Nimmer, supra, at 267 & n.28. Based on a data set assem-
bled and provided to me by Matthew Sag, I conducted a logistic regression of the
courts' determinations of the outcomes on Nimmer's determinations of the outcomes
of the four factors. On this regression, the only significant factor outcome was the sec-
ond, going to the nature of the plaintiff's work, and the coefficient was negative.
Thanks to Matthew Sag for informing me of this curious result.
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To answer this and other questions, this Article presents the re-
sults of the first empirical study of our fair use case law.13 Working
from a data set consisting of all reported federal opinions that made
substantial use of the section 107 four-factor test from the January 1,
1978, effective date of the Copyright Act through 2005, the Article
shows that much of our conventional wisdom about our fair use case
law, deduced as it has been from the leading cases, is wrong. The dual
purpose of the Article is systematically to induce from the population
of section 107 opinions what our fair use doctrine actually is in prac-
tice, and critically to induce from that population of opinions what it
ought to be.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides background on
section 107 and identifies in the data the curious origins of the highly
routinized fashion in which judges typically apply its four factors. Part
II sets forth summary statistics on the 306 opinions studied, including
their distribution along the dimensions of time, venue, posture, and
the kind of copyrightable work at issue. The Part further reveals the
full extent to which the Second and Ninth Circuits dominate our fair
use case law. It also identifies and seeks to explain the remarkable in-
crease in the prevalence of fair use summary judgment opinions that
began in the mid-1990s and has continued to the present, and the just
as remarkable absence of fair use bench trial opinions during the
same period. It then reports the reversal, dissent, and appeal rates in
the fair use case law and finds that notwithstanding strong conven-
tional wisdom to the contrary, none of these are especially high as
compared to other areas of law. Finally, and perhaps most interest-
ingly, the Part sets out the fair use win rates (i.e., the proportion of
opinions that found fair use) in the case law. For certain postures,
these rates were exceptionally low. The Part seeks to explain why.
13 The method employed here is generally referred to as "content analysis." See
Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis ofJudicial Opinions 3 (Wake
Forest Univ. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No.
913336, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=913336 (defining content analysis
as an empirical method by which "a scholar collects a set of documents (for instance,
judicial opinions on a particular subject), reads the documents systematically, records
consistent features of each one, and then draws inferences about the use and meaning
of those documents"); see also Fred Kort, Content Analysis ofJudicial Opinions and Rules of
Law, in JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 133 (Glendon Schubert, ed. 1963) (providing a
quantitative formulation of rules of law as a content analysis method for the interpreta-
tion ofjudicial decision making); Reed C. Lawlor, Fact Content Analysis ofJudicial Opin-
ions, 8JURIMETRICSJ. 107, 110 (1968) (using content analysis of fact patterns in judi-
cial opinions to develop a method for predicting the outcome of future cases).
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Parts III and IV then focus on howjudges used the four-factor test.
Part III engages in an interfactor analysis of the test as applied. It fo-
cuses on the factor outcomes and shows how these outcomes inter-
acted with each other and with the overall test outcome. Correlation
and regression analyses reveal the surprising extent to which the out-
comes of the first and especially the fourth factors appear to drive the
outcome of the test. The Part also reports the results of a word count
analysis of the opinions across time. It concludes by considering the
extent to which judges "stampeded" 4 the factor outcomes to conform
to the overall test outcome. The data show that, again, notwithstand-
ing strong conventional wisdom to the contrary, and notwithstanding
the examples of certain leading cases, judges do not generally stam-
pede the factor outcomes. Rather than make a fair use determination
first and then "align the four factors to fit that result as best they
can, "15 courts appeared quite willing to call the factor outcomes as
they saw them, even when those outcomes did not support the overall
test outcome. This is a highly encouraging finding.
Part IV then turns to an intrafactor analysis of the fair use test as
applied. It looks inside each of the four factors to determine which
subfactor considerations animated courts' determinations of the fac-
tor outcomes and, through those factor outcomes, the outcome of the
overall fair use test. Regression analysis, as well as simple descriptive
statistics, shows that certain subfactor findings were far more important
14 The metaphor of stampeding is adopted from Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study
of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1614-15 (2006).
The hypothesis is thatjudges decide the outcome of a multifactor test based on a lim-
ited number of core factors, possibly only one. The judge then tends to ensure that
most, if not all, of the remaining factors follow the lead of this dispositive factor. Al-
ternatively, the hypothesis is that certain multifactor tests are by their own nature
prone to stampeding, primarily because the factors are redundant. The idea of stam-
peding is based in part on the "coherence-based reasoning model" proposed by Dan
Simon and others, see Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in
Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 511, 513 (2004) ("Coherence-based reasoning
posits that the mind shuns cognitively complex and difficult decision tasks by recon-
structing them into easy ones, yielding strong, confident conclusions."), and in part on
the "fast and frugal" heuristics research of Gerd Gigerenzer and others, see Gerd Gig-
erenzer & Daniel G. Goldstein, Reasoning the Fast and Frugal Way: Models of Bounded Ra-
tionality, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 650, 666 (1996) (arguing that simple psychological
mechanisms that operate under constraints of limited time and knowledge can pro-
duce as many correct inferences as more complex analyses). Cf Nimmer, supra note
12, at 281 n.62 ("Alternatively, as courts work their way through the four factors, at
some point they decide what the ultimate conclusion should be-which, in turn, molds
the way that they reach resolution as to which direction each factor points.").
15 Nimmer, supra note 12, at 281.
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to the outcome of the fair use test than is generally thought, and that
others thought to be important actually had no significant influence
on the outcome of the test. For example, a finding that the plaintiffs
work was factual in nature or published appeared strongly to influ-
ence a court to find fair use, 16 as did a finding that the defendant's use
was for a noncommercial purpose.' 7 Meanwhile, the data suggest that
a finding that the defendant's use was for a commercial (rather than
noncommercial) purpose had no significant influence on the out-
come of the test, and a finding that the defendant used the entirety of
the plaintiffs work was far from dispositive. More generally, and
more disturbingly, the Part shows the extent to which lower courts re-
peatedly either deliberately ignored or were ignorant of basic, albeit
dictic, Supreme Court precedent. Indeed, the data show that the
lower courts repeatedly and systematically inverted Supreme Court
dicta to favor the defendant, so that if the Court stated, for example,
only that "not x" favors the plaintiff, the primary lesson the lower
courts would draw from this is that "x" favors the defendant. This may
come as a pleasant surprise to fair use maximalists, who are generally
pessimistic about the state of our fair use case law and the judges who
produce it. But when the lower courts systematically resist the author-
ity of the Supreme Court, and on issues of central importance to an
area of law, this is cause for concern regardless of the policy outcome.
The Part suggests that the indiscipline of the lower courts is largely
the fault of the Supreme Court itself and its repeated unwillingness
explicitly to correct its own past mistakes in its fair use opinions. This
has left the lower courts with an array of "accumulating precedent"
from which to choose. ,8
Part V concludes by reflecting on the prescriptive implications of
the study's findings. In the mass of everyday fair use case law, and in
the interstices of the four factors, we can identify which considerations
most commonly formed the basis of judges' fair use determinations.
These findings we can welcome as empirical precedent, that is, as
precedent based on the empirical analysis of how the population of
judges who have previously employed a legal doctrine did so. In the
16 See infta Part IV.B and Table 9.
17 See infra Part IV.A.1 and Table 9.
18 See generally Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin's
Chain Novel Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156, 1205-06 (2005)
(studying the effect of precedent on judicial decisionmaking and finding, generally,
that "[t] he growth of precedent in an area [of law] does not appear to restrict judicial
discretion; if anything, the development of the law may increase such discretion").
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near term, we are stuck with section 107, "botched job"'9 that it may
be, and the task is to make the best of what we have. But in the long
term, the more important task is to induce-both systematically and
critically-from the section 107 case law we have what form a new sec-
tion 107 might someday take.
I. BACKGROUND
As a foundation for the discussion that follows in subsequent
Parts, this Part briefly reviews the language and legislative history of
section 107. It then describes the highly routinized analytical and rhe-
torical style that judges employed when they applied the section 107
test. This style greatly facilitated reliable coding of the data set.' °
A. Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976
Structurally, the Copyright Act leans toward protection; it gives
broadly and takes away narrowly. Section 106 enumerates in expan-
sive terms the exclusive rights that a copyright owner enjoys in a copy-
righted work.2' Sections 107 through 122 then set forth "limitations"
22
on these exclusive rights. Most of these limiting sections contain
highly specific, even regulatory language. 3 Section 107, however,
24
among the briefest of the limiting sections, is extraordinarily broad
in scope. The Section states in full:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of
a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for pur-
poses such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an in-
fringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a
work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall
include-
19 Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L.
REv. 1137, 1151 (1990).
20 For a discussion of the process of collecting and coding the opinions that com-
prised the data set for this study, see the Appendix.
21 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
22 Id. §§ 107-122.
23 See generallyJoseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87 (2004) (exam-
ining the "implications of the increasingly regulatory nature of U.S. copyright law").
24 The only limiting section shorter in word count is section 120, involving the scope
of exclusive rights in architectural works. See 17 U.S.C. § 120 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
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(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educa-
tional purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in rela-
tion to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair
use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.25
Section 107 thus consists of three parts:26  a preamble that identifies
"the fair use of a copyrighted work" as an exception to the copyright
owner's exclusive rights and that gives examples of fair "purposes," a
list of four factors that courts must consider in determining whether a
use is a fair use, v and an additional statement regarding unpublished
works that was added in 1992.8
A detailed account of the legislative history of section 107 is be-
yond the scope of this Article and is available elsewhere. 29 It is inter-
25 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
26 Cf Weinreb, supra note 19, at 1139 ("Congress adopted three considerably in-
consistent ways of doing nothing: simple reference to fair use, specification of what is
fair use by illustrative examples, and prescription of nonexclusive 'factors to be consid-
ered' in determining whether a particular use is fair. As Hercule Poirot observed
about the murder on the Orient Express, the problem is not that there are too few
clues but that there are too many." (footnotes omitted)).
27 Judge Posner was quite dismissive of the factors in 7, Inc. v. Publications Interna-
tional, Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 522 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that the "statutory definition" of
fair use, "though extensive[,] is not illuminating"). On remand, District CourtJudge
Zagel nevertheless explained to the defendant, who adopted Judge Posner's approach
"[t]o its detriment," that "regardless of what PIL claims the Seventh Circuit did, statu-
tory and case authority mandate that the four fair use factors must be considered and
applied in every case, including this remand." Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l., Ltd., 333 F.
Supp. 2d 705, 715-16 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
2s Act of Oct. 24, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-492, 106 Stat. 3145; see also Kenneth D.
Crews, Fair Use of Unpublished Works: Burdens of Proof and the Integrity of Copyright, 31
ARIz. ST. L.J. 1, 49-66 (1999) (discussing the legislative history of the 1992 amendment
and its impact on the fair use case law).
29 See, e.g., WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 261-365
(2d ed. 1995). For an account of the legislative history of the Copyright Act in general,
see Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REv. 275
(1989) and Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative Histoy, 72 CORNELL
L. REv. 857 (1987).
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esting to note, however, that early on in the two decades of negotia-
tions that led to the Act, a variety of interested parties urged that the
Act not reference fair use at all, or if it did, that its reference take the
form of a "bare bones"3 ° one-sentence limitation. Their concern was
that statutory recognition of fair use would "freeze" or otherwise un-
31
predictably alter the judge-made doctrine . Indeed, in 1965, after
draft provisions similar in structure to the current section 107 raised a
storm of objections-many of them the same objections we hear to-
day-the negotiations focused on the following draft provision:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copy-
righted work is not an infringement of copyright."3 2 This proposed
language failed to win consensus, however, and the next year negotia-
tions shifted back to the consideration of a provision taking the struc-
ture of a preamble and four factors.33
The language of the preamble and factors changed in some cases
dramatically through the course of the negotiations. As for the pre-
amble, which was explicitly referenced by 22% of the 306 opinions
studied, an initial 1963 draft proposed simple language that did little
other than identify fair use as a "privilege. 34 Three identical 1964
bills then proposed a more involved "legitimate purpose" require-
ment.35 Dropped in 1965, the preamble returned in 1966 in a form
quite similar to the final version of section 107.36 All that was missing
was the parenthetical "(including multiple copies for classroom use),"
which was added at the eleventh hour in early 1976. 3' As this addition
reflects, the main controversy surrounding the section's preambulary
language, if not the fair use section as a whole, concerned an emer-
30 See, e.g., Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831,
and H.R. 6835 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 1216
(1965) (statement of Association of American University Presses); id. at 1714 (state-
ment of the American Bar Association).
31 See, e.g., H. COMM. ON THE JUDIcIARY, 88TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REvISION
PART 3, at 158 (Comm. Print 1964) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 3].
32 H.R. 4347, 89th Cong. § 107 (1966); S. 1006, 89th Cong. § 107 (1967); see also
PATRY, supra note 29, at 277-96 (providing a history of the debates surrounding the
bills).
33 PATRY, supra note 29, at 296-319.
34 See COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 3, supra note 31, at 6.
35 See H.R. 11947, H.R. 12354, and S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in
H. COMM. ON THE JUDIcIARY, 89TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 5, at 1-32
(Comm. Print 1964) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 5].
36 SeeH.R. 4347 § 107.
37 PATRY, supra note 29, at 351.
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gent technology of the time: photocopying."' The negotiating parties
may have overestimated the future significance to fair use of photo-
copying technology, however. Only 14 opinions from 9 cases ad-
dressed facts involving photocopying, and only 5 of these opinions
explicitly referenced the language of section 107's preamble.39
The language of section 107's factors was largely drawn from Jus-
tice Joseph Story's 1841 circuit court opinion in Folsom v. Marsh,40 an
opinion whose influence on American fair use case law up to the 1976
Act we have probably overestimated, or so the data suggest,4' but
whose influence since is quite clear.42 A 1963 draft stated that "the fol-
See id. (noting that the House subcommittee chose to address multiple copying
in section 107 even though it was already being addressed in privately drafted guide-
lines).
39 Of course, a more optimistic interpretation of these data is that the preamble of
section 107, together with various privately drafted guidelines, sufficiently clarified the
issue so that litigation over it was rarely necessary. For a discussion of the history of fair
use and privately drafted fair use guidelines, see Kenneth D. Crews, The Law of Fair Use
and the Illusion of Fair-Use Guidelines, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 599 (2001).
40 9 F. Cas. 342 (D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). For an overview of Folsom v. Marsh,
see R. Anthony Reese, The Story of Folsom v. Marsh: Distinguishing Between Infringing
and Legitimate Uses, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 259 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Ro-
chelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006).
41 A total of 44 federal cases cited to Folsom from 1841 through 1977. This citation
count is based on a search for the string "Folsom v Marsh" in the Wesflaw "allfeds-old"
database and the Lexis "Federal Courts Cases Before 1945, Combined" database for
federal case law before 1945 (the temporal limit of both of these databases), and in the
Westlaw "allfeds" database for federal case law after 1944. The Lexis pre-1945 database
yielded 5 cases not found in the Westlaw pre-1945 database. For a rough scale by
which to assess Folsom's citation count from 1841 to 1977, consider that a Westlaw
search of the federal case law from the same periods for cases including the terms "fair
use" and "copyright" yielded 125 cases, of which only 15 cited to Folsom. Early-
twentieth-century treatises also failed to emphasize Folsom. See, e.g., RICHARD ROGERS
BOWKER, COPYRIGHT: ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAW 252 (1912) (referencing Folsom once,
for a proposition relating to piracy, in a fourteen-page discussion of fair use); WILLIAM
BRIGGS, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT (1906) (failing to refer to Folsom at
all); RICHARD C. DE WOLF, AN OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT LAw 140-167 (1925) (discussing
fair use but failing to reference Folsom).
42 Of the 306 opinions sampled for this study, 47 opinions (15.4%) cited to Folsom,
with 26.1% of the appellate opinions doing so, and 42.9% of the Supreme Court opin-
ions doing so. In 40 of these 47 opinions, the judge either quoted directly from Folsom,
quoted indirectly from Folsom by noting that he was quoting from an opinion that was
itself quoting from Folsom, or otherwise discussed the facts in Folsom. One of these 40
purported to quote directly from Folsom, though, pedantically speaking, it did so in er-
ror. See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1261 n.9 (11th Cir.
2001) ("In Folsom v. Marsh .... Justice Story created the concept of 'fair use."'). Justice
Story did not use the term "fair use" in Folsom. The term of art apparently first ap-
peared in reported federal case law in Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 58, 61 (D. Mass.
1869) (No. 8136).
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lowing factors, among others, shall be considered," and then listed out
the four factors nearly as we have them today.43 Bills from 1964 nar-
rowed the introductory statement ("the factors to be considered shall
include") and added the phrase "market for or" to factor four." Fi-
nally, in early 1976, primarily to allay the concerns of educators,4' the
Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary responsible
for the Copyright Act added the following phrase to factor one: "in-
cluding whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes." 46 Despite the committee's best efforts at the
time to downplay its significance in their reports,47 this phrase has
since caused no end of trouble, as we will see in Part III.
B. Courts' Mechanical Application of the Four-Factor Test
Had the drafters of the statutory language of section 107 known
how judges would end up actually applying that language, they may
very well have fallen back on the 1965 one-sentence provision after all.
In the opinions studied, courts often acknowledged that the four-
factor test should not be applied formulaically; as one court put it,
the test does not "constitute an algorithm that enables decisions to be
ground out mechanically. 4 1 Yet the data show that after an initial pe-
43 See COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 3, supra note 31, at 6. In his earlier Tenta-
tive Draft Report, the Register of Copyrights phrased the factors slightly differently.
For the exact phrasing, see PATRY, supra note 29, at 264.
44 See H.R. 11947, H.R. 12354, and S. 3008, 88th Cong. (1964), reprinted in
COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION PART5, supra note 35, at 5.
45 Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 9, at 678-79.
46 PATRY, supra note 29, at 351; Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 9, at 678.
47 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5679 (noting that the amendment "is not intended to be interpreted as any sort
of not-for-profit limitation on educational uses of copyrighted works," but is rather "an
express recognition that, as under the present law, the commercial or nonprofit char-
acter of an activity, while not conclusive with respect to fair use, can and should be
weighed along with other factors in fair use decisions").
48 See, e.g., Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1323 (2d Cir. 1989) ("Analysis
begins not by elevating the statutory guides into inflexible rules, but with a review of
the underlying equities."); Fin. Info., Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., Inc., 751 F.2d 501,
508 (2d Cir. 1984) ("The four factors... are equitable considerations to be assessed
and weighed by the court; they are not simply hurdles over which an accused infringer
may leap to safety from liability. Rather than a sequence of four rigid tests, the fair use
analysis consists of a 'sensitive balancing of interests."' (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 n.40 (1984))).
49 Chicago Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 2003) (Pos-
ner, J.); see also Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 9, at 685 ("Before fair use was incorpo-
rated in the statute, courts did not treat the factors as a checklist, with each factor re-
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riod of flexibility, judges shifted in the late 1980s toward a rhetorically
quite formal and explicit treatment of the section 107 factors. Figure
1 shows the proportion of opinions over time in which the court
adopted the rhetorical practice of explicitly stating which party each
factor favored. ° Overall, judges engaged in this practice in 59.5% of
the 306 opinions. Some judges also concluded their section 107
analysis with a summary explicitly reviewing the valence of each factor.
Overall,judges did so in 32.7% of the opinions.
51
Interestingly, the shift toward a routinized application of the sec-
tion 107 test roughly coincided with the Supreme Court's May 1985
issuance of its opinion in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter-
prises,2 in which the Court found that The Nation's unauthorized pub-
lication of excerpts from President Gerald Ford's soon-to-be-published
autobiography was not a fair use. In her opinion for the majority, Jus-
tice O'Connor was deliberate in her application of section 107, but
did not engage in the kind of mechanical rhetoric that we see in most
duced to a plus or minus. The mere listing of four factors in the 1976 Act, however,
has led some courts improperly to take this approach.").
50 See, e.g., Schiffer Publ'g, Ltd. v. Chronicle Books, LLC, No. 03-4962, 2004 WL
2583817, at *12-13 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 2004) ("In sum, Defendants' use of Plaintiffs'
work was not a fair use. Because the first, third, and fourth fair use factors favor Plain-
tiffs, and because none of the factors strongly favor Defendants, this Court holds that
Defendants have not met their burden of proving that their appropriation of Plaintiffs'
works constitutes fair use."); Batesville Servs., Inc. v. Funeral Depot, Inc., No. 02-01011,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24336, at *22-26 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 10, 2004) ("The first factor thus
weighs heavily against the fair use defense .... This [second] factor is essentially neu-
tral on Funeral Depot's fair use defense .... This [third] factor weighs against the fair
use defense .... This [fourth] factor tends to weigh in favor of the fair use de-
fense....").
51 See, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 822 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Having
considered the four fair use factors and found that two weigh in favor of Arriba, one is
neutral, and one weighs slightly in favor of Kelly, we conclude that Arriba's use of
Kelly's images as thumbnails in its search engine is a fair use."); Narell v. Freeman, 872
F.2d 907, 915 (9th Cir. 1989) ("In sum, the first factor weighs strongly in Narell's favor
and the second factor slightly favors Freeman. However, a reasonable juror could only
conclude that the third and final factors strongly favor Freeman."); Salinger v. Random
House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99-100 (2d Cir. 1987) ("On balance, the claim of fair use as
to Salinger's unpublished letters fails. The second and third factors weigh heavily in
Salinger's favor, and the fourth factor slightly so. Only the first factor favors Hamil-
ton."); Coll. Entrance Exam. Bd. v. Cuomo, 788 F. Supp. 134, 143 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) ("In
conclusion, given the fact that factor one favors the State, factor two favors GMAC, and
factors three and four favor neither party, the court holds that GMAC has not demon-
strated a likelihood of success on the merits of its copyright infringement claim.").
52 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
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fair use opinions from 1987 to the present.3 Justice Brennan's dis-
sent, however, was highly mechanical in form. It both explicitly stated
the valences of each factor 54 and explicitly summed up the balance of
those valences in its conclusion." This dissent arguably set American
courts on a course toward a rhetorically more mechanical treatment
of the section 107 inquiry56-notwithstanding the fact that the dissent
itself urged courts to recognize that the section 107 factors "do not
mechanistically resolve fair use issues.
"
,
7
Figure 1: Twenty-Opinion Moving Average of the Proportion
of Opinions Explicitly Stating the Valence of the
Factors and Explicitly Reviewing the
Valence of the Factors
Harper & Row (1985)
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As further evidence of the generally routinized manner in which
they employed the section 107 test, judges rarely explicitly considered
factors beyond the four listed in section 107 and, with the exception of
53 See id. at 549-69 (recounting the history of fair use and evaluating each factor in
light of the purpose of the fair use defense).
54 Id. at 590-603 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
55 Id. at 604-05.
Cf Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative Histo7y, supra note 29, at 861
n.37 (noting that in Sony and Harper & Row, "the Supreme Court adopted a test that
rigidifies the statute's major flexibility principle").
57 471 U.S. at 588 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
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the second factor, rarely failed to consider fewer than all four factors.5s
Commentators have long called upon courts to look to additional fac-
tors, 9 such as "fairness,"60 and in the opinions studied, the courts them-
selves frequently acknowledged that the section 107 test is illustrative
rather than limitative. 6' Yet only 17.0% of the opinions explicitly con-
sidered one or more additional factors, and only 8.8% stated that the
additional factor was relevant to the fair use determination.
Thus, the methodical fashion in which judges used the four-factor
test to make their fair use determinations provides an orderly frame-
work for systematic study. Whether this particular form of "mechanical
jurisprudence"6 2 has been good for the law is, of course, another mat-
ter, one which I will address in later Parts. First, however, to build a
foundation for a close analysis of the operation of the four-factor test, I
discuss in the next Part the general characteristics of the opinions.
II. SUMMARY STATISTICS
A. Distributions of the Opinions
In the twenty-eight years from the January 1, 1978 effective date of
58 Of the 306 opinions, 6.9% failed to consider the first factor, 17.7% failed to
consider the second factor, 13.4% failed to consider the third factor, and 8.8% failed
to consider the fourth factor.
59 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 7, at 1614 (proposing that courts consider whether
"(1) market failure is present; (2) transfer of the use to defendant is socially desirable;
and (3) an award of fair use would not cause substantial injury to the incentives of the
plaintiff copyright owner"); Madison, supra note 7, at 1687 (calling upon judges to
conduct a "pattern-oriented" analysis of the fair use issue); see also Fisher, supra note 7,
at 1678-86 (discussing the relevance of various subfactor concerns to the fair use de-
termination); Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property,
93 VA. L. REv. 1899 (2007) (discussing the relevance of industry "custom" to the fair
use determination).
W See Weinreb, supra note 19, at 1140 (urging courts to take into account factors
such as customary practice in their fairness determinations).
6 See, e.g., Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 394 (4th Cir. 2003) ("These factors are not
meant to be exclusive, but rather illustrative, representing only general guidance about
the sorts of copying that courts and Congress most commonly have found to be fair
uses." (citations and internal quotations omitted)); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony
Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 448 (C.D. Cal. 1979) ("The factors are illustrative, not
definitive."), affd in part, rev'd in part, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981).
62 Cf RONALD DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 15-16 (1977) (criticizing the
nominalist conception of law as a warehouse of rules discovered and applied mechani-
cally by judges); Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REv,. 605, 605-07
(1908) (criticizing the conception of law as science insofar as it becomes an end in it-
self rather than a means to administerjustice).
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the 1976 Act to the conclusion of 2005, the federal courts produced
306 reported opinions from 215 cases that made substantial use 63 of
the section 107 four-factor test. This averages out to 10.9 opinions per
year during the twenty-eight year period, with an average of 4.6 opin-
ions per year actually finding fair use. Though sufficient for purposes
of basic statistical analysis, this is a surprisingly low number of opin-
ions for such an important area of copyright law, particularly one that
has received so much academic attention. 4 It is all the more surpris-
ing in light of Federal Judicial Center data that suggests that a steady
average of approximately 2000 copyright infringement complaints
were filed per year in federal district courts during the same period.
65
A number of factors may account for the paucity of reported fair use
opinions, the most obvious being that many fair use disputes may
never reach the courts. 66 In any event, it is important to recognize
that this study is concerned with a small but crucially important region
63 The Appendix discusses the "substantial use" standard used to filter the opin-
ions. In short, the data set included all opinions from the period sampled that cited to
the section 107 test and referenced at least two factors from the test.
64 There were typically far more law review articles than actual court opinions on
fair use in each of the years sampled. A search of the Westlaw "tp-all" database for the
years 1990-2005, using the search string, ti("fair use") & da([year]), shows that the ra-
tio of law review articles in that database containing the phrase "fair use" in their titles
to actual court opinions on fair use was about 2.4:1 during that period. For the years
2000-2005, the ratio was 3.3:1.
65 INTER-UNRVERSITY CONSORTIUM FOR POL. & Soc. RESEARCH, FEDERAL COURT
CASES: INTEGRATED DATA BASE, 2003 (ICPSR Study No. 4026, 2005); INTER-UNWERSITY
CONSORTIUM FOR POL. & Soc. RESEARCH, FEDERAL COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATA
BASE, 2002 (ICPSR Study No. 4059, 2005); INTER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM FOR POL. &
Soc. RESEARCH, FEDERAL COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATA BASE, 2001 (ICPSR Study
No. 3415, 2005); INTER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM FOR POL. & Soc. RESEARCH, FEDERAL
COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATA BASE, 1970-2000 (ICPSR Study No. 8429, 2005). Ac-
cording to these databases, for the years 1978 up to and including 2003, the mean
number of filings per year under the Nature of Suit category "820 Copyright" was
1990.67 (standard deviation = 6.83).
66 Even while fair use concerns may pervade the public sphere (and legal-
academic commentary on it), many fair use controversies may never take the form of a
filed complaint, as potential fair uses are "chilled" by the mere threat of litigation.
Empirical work supports this explanation. See MARJORIE HEINS & TRIcIA BECKLES,
BRENNAN CTR. FORJUSTICE, WILL FAIR USE SURvrIVE? FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF
COPYRIGHT CONTROL 8, 35-36 (2005) (assessing the speech-suppressing effects of
cease-and-desist letters). Indeed, the very unpredictability of fair use outcomes may
lead defendants to settle, whether before or after litigation has been joined, particu-
larly when the defendant need only make narrow alterations in its speech in order to
avert the risk of broad injunctive relief and the imposition of damages. For a theoreti-
cal account of the cost-benefit analysis underlying the pleading of a fair use defense,
see Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93 IOWA L. REV. (forth-
coming 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=951839.
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in the larger world of fair use: its case law. The data can tell us a
great deal about the case law and how the four-factor test has oper-
ated within it. Because of the fundamental problem of selection bias,
however, we cannot reasonably ask the data to do more.67
1. Distribution of the Opinions by Year and Venue
Figure 2 sets out the distribution by year of the district and circuit
court opinions studied. Though the data show no clear turning point,
the average number of district court fair use opinions per year shifted
substantially through the course of the late 1980s and early 1990s. This
shift may reflect, at least in part, the appearance in the fair use case law
of disputes involving computer software, the first of which appeared in
1988,6 and Internet technology, the first of which appeared in 1993.69
The Supreme Court has addressed section 107 in seven opinions from
four cases, all of them falling within the period studied: Sony v. Univer-
sal City Studios, Inc.70 (1984), Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation En-
terprises71 (1985), Stewart v. Abend 72 (1990), and Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Mu
sic, Inc.73 (1994). Sony and Harper & Row each produced one dissent,
74
75while Campbell produced a brief concurrence.
67 See generally Ahmed E. Taha, Data and Selection Bias: A Case Study, 75 UMKC L.
REV. 171 (2006) (discussing the effects of selection bias on the results of empirical
studies of whether judges' political orientations affect litigation outcomes); David A.
Hoffman, Alan J. Izenman & Jeffrey R. Lidicker, Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine,
85 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=982130
("Many authors have drawn exceedingly strong normative claims based on datasets
that docketology reveals to be substantially biased.").
68 See Telerate Sys., Inc. v. Caro, 689 F. Supp. 221, 228-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (denying the
fair use defense of a subscriber to a computerized financial information service who copied
the provider's database and sold the information as part of its software package).
69 See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1557-59 (M.D. Fla. 1993)
(holding that use of copyrighted photographs on an Internet bulletin board was not a
protected fair use).
70 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
71 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
72 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
73 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
74 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 579-605 (Brennan,J., dissenting); Sony, 464 U.S. at
457-500 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
75 See Campbell 510 U.S at 596-600 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Figure 2: Distribution of District and Circuit Court
Opinions by Year
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The district and circuit courts of the Second and Ninth Circuits
dominated the sample" across the twenty-eight-year period 71 in two
closely related ways. First, their courts contributed the great bulk of
the opinions sampled. Table 1 reports that Second Circuit courts ac-
counted for 38.6% of the circuit court opinions and 35.1% of the dis-
trict court opinions, while Ninth Circuit courts were responsible for
28.4% of the circuit court opinions and 18.0% of the district court
opinions. Percentages for all other circuits, even the Seventh, were in
the single digits. At the district court level, the Southern District of
New York (S.D.N.Y.) alone accounted for 31.3% of the district court
opinions, with the Northern District of California next at 7.6%.
Second, the data show that fair use opinions from courts of the
Second and Ninth Circuits exerted a great deal of influence-much
more than is generally thought-on fair use opinions outside of those
circuits. Specifically, data on the import and export of fair use case
citations between the various circuits in the opinions studied demon-
76 1 use the term "sample" because, though this project sought to study the entire
population of federal opinions that applied the four-factor test from 1978 through
2005, I cannot be sure that I collected all such opinions.
77 There was no significant variation over time in the distribution of opinions by venue
or in the degree to which opinions from courts of the Second and Ninth Circuit were cited
by courts outside of those circuits. It is notable, however, that 35 of the 38 opinions (or
92%) sampled from the district courts of the Ninth Circuit dated from after 1990. This
does not, however, appear to reflect the rise of computer software and Internet fair use case
law, as only 6 of these 35 opinions involved computer software or Internet facts.
District Coun Opinions
-- Circuit Court Opinions
-3 per. Mov. Avg. (District Court Opinions)
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strate that the Second and the Ninth Circuits both enjoyed substantial
trade surpluses. For example, circuit and district court opinions from
outside the Second Circuit cited to an average of 1.55 circuit court
cases from the Second Circuit per fair use analysis, and those from
outside the Ninth Circuit cited to an average of 0.68 circuit court cases
from the Ninth Circuit per fair use analysis. No other circuits boasted
nearly as much influence outside of their borders. The next most in-
fluential circuit after the Ninth was the Fifth, with 0.14 Fifth Circuit
cases cited per fair use analysis by circuit and district courts outside of
the Fifth Circuit-and this is largely the result of the authority of pre-
1981 Fifth Circuit case law for courts of the Eleventh Circuit. 78 In fact,
by this measure, S.D.N.Y. courts were more influential than any circuit
court other than the Second and the Ninth Circuits and were nearly
as influential as the Ninth Circuit. Circuit courts outside the Second
Circuit cited to an average of 0.59 S.D.N.Y. cases per fair use analysis,
while district courts outside the Second Circuit cited to an average of
0.60 S.D.N.Y. cases per fair use analysis. Ultimately, circuit and district
courts of the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits were the only courts
that cited on average more often to opinions from their own circuit
court than to opinions from the circuit courts of either the Second or
the Ninth Circuits.
Thus, when we speak of modem U.S. fair use case law, we are speak-
ing primarily of the 122 opinions generated by four courts-the Supreme
Court, the Second and Ninth Circuits, and the Southern District of New
York-and the progeny of these opinions in the other federal courts.
This makes the detection of intercircuit variation in our fair use case law
a hazardous enterprise. Nevertheless, as I will discuss in Part IV, the data
suggest that, when taking into consideration a variety of other factors, the
Second Circuit stands out as a relatively fair-use-friendly circuit. 79
78 See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (holding
that cases decided by the Fifth Circuit prior to October 1, 1981 are the law of the Elev-
enth Circuit).
79 See infra note 142 and Table 9.
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Table 1: Distribution of Circuit and
District Court Opinions
Circuit Court
Opinions District Court Opinions
Circuit n % n % District n %
1 1 1.1 8 3.8 D. Mass. 7 3.3
D.N.H. 1 0.5
2 34 38.6 74 35.1 N.D.N.Y. 3 1.4
E.D.N.Y. 2 0.9
S.D.N.Y. 66 31.3
W.D.N.Y. 3 1.4
3 1 1.1 9 4.3 D.NJ. 2 0.9
E.D. Pa. 5 2.4
W.D. Pa. 1 0.5
D. Del. 1 0.5
4 3 3.4 12 5.7 D. Md. 4 1.9
E.D. Va. 5 2.4
M.D.N.C. 1 0.5
W.D. Va. 2 0.9
5 4 4.6 8 3.8 N.D. Tex. 2 0.9
E.D. Tex. 1 0.5
S.D. Tex. 4 1.9
W.D. Tex. 1 0.5
6 8 9.1 12 5.7 E.D. Ky. 1 0.5
E.D. Mich. 6 2.8
W.D. Mich. 2 0.9
N.D. Ohio 1 0.5
E.D. Tenn. 1 0.5
M.D. Tenn. 1 0.5
7 3 3.4 12 5.7 N.D. Il. 11 5.2
S.D. 11. 1 0.5
8 2 2.3 10 4.7 D. Minn. 8 3.8
W.D. Mo. 1 0.5
D. Neb. 1 0.5
9 25 28.4 38 18.0 N.D. Cal. 16 7.6
C.D. Cal. 12 5.7
S.D. Cal. 5 2.4
D. Nev. 2 0.9
D. Or. 3 1.4
10 - - 7 3.3 D. Colo. 2 0.9
D. Kan. 4 1.9
N.D. Okla. 1 0.5
11 6 6.8 14 6.6 M.D. Fla. 2 0.9
S.D. Fla. 3 1.4
N.D. Ga. 9 4.3
DC 1 1.1 7 3.3 D.D.C. 7 3.3
Total 88 211 211
570 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 156:549
2. Distribution of District Court Opinions by Posture
Table 2 reports the distribution of postures in the district court
opinions. More than half of the opinions addressed a motion or
cross-motion for summary judgment, and of these 121 opinions, 86%
granted the motion or one of the cross-motions. This supports the
conventional wisdom that courts regularly resolve fair use issues at the
80summary judgment stage.
More interesting is the distribution of the posture of district court
opinions across time. Figure 3 shows a moving average of the propor-
tion of district court opinions that took the form of either a prelimi-
nary injunction, summary judgment, or bench trial opinion. In 1994,
there was a substantial drop-off in the proportion per year of bench
trial opinions, so that up to and including 1993, the sample included,
in absolute numbers, an average of 1.9 bench trial opinions per year,
and 0.5 bench trial opinions per year thereafter. Indeed, for the
seven-year period from 1999 to 2005, the sample included only one
district court bench trial opinion."' At the same time, the data indi-
cate a fairly dramatic increase, beginning in the early to mid-1990s, in
the proportion of opinions which engaged in summary adjudication
of the fair use defense.
Table 2: Distribution of District Court
Opinions by Posture
("Found FU" denotes the proportion of opinions that found fair use;
"Found No FU" denotes the proportion of opinions that found no fair use)
Posture n % Found FU Found No FU
Preliminary Injunction 50 23.7 .300 .700
SJ-Plaintiff 24 11.4 - .875
SJ-Defendant 38 18.0 .763 -
Cross-SJs 59 28.0 .389 .525
Bench Trial 37 17.5 .324 .676
Motion To Dismiss 2 1.0 .000 1.000
JNOV Motion 1 0.5 .000 1.000
Total 211 .389 .588
80 See, e.g., Castle Rock Entm't, Inc., v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 137
(2d. Cir. 1998) (noting that although "[flair use is a mixed question of law and fact,"
the Second Circuit has often resolved fair use issues at the summary judgment stage,
where there are no genuine issues of material fact (alteration in original)).
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Figure 3: Twenty-Opinion Moving Average of the Proportion of
District Court Preliminary Injunction, Bench Trial, and
Summary Judgment Opinions
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Though these results are consistent with recent work on the "van-
ishing trial" in American courts,12 they nevertheless remain something
of a mystery. The drop-off in bench trials coincides with the Supreme
Court's issuance in March 1994 of its landmark opinion in Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose. 83  The district court in Campbell had granted summary
judgment to the defendant, finding that the musical group 2 Live
Crew's appropriation of certain elements of Roy Orbison's song
"Pretty Woman" in its parody of the song constituted a fair use. 4 In
reversing and remanding, the Sixth Circuit criticized the district court
for giving insufficient weight to the presumption established by the
Sony Court a decade earlier that "[e]very commercial use of copy-
righted material is presumptively [unfair] . In itself reversing and
remanding, the Supreme Court emphatically rejected the Sony pre-
81 Schiffer Publ'g, Ltd. v. Chronicle Books, LLC, No. 03-4962, 2004 WL 2583817
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 2004).
82 For examples, see the articles collected in the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies's
issue dedicated to the topic, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459-984 (2004).
83 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1158-59 (M.D. Tenn.
1991).
85 Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1436-37 (6th Cir. 1992).
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sumption and explicitly demoted the commerciality of the defen-
dant's use to merely one issue among others that a court may consider
as part of its analysis of the "purpose and character" of the defen-
dant's use.8' The Court then remanded for further fact-finding under
factors three and four of section 107.7 The mystery is thus that the
reported drop-off in bench trial opinions and increase in summary
judgment opinions coincided with a Supreme Court opinion that not
only remanded a summary judgment ruling, but abrogated a key pre-
sumption facilitating summary adjudication of the fair use defense.
In addition to the more general vanishing-trial phenomenon,
there may be two copyright-specific explanations for this coinci-
dence-though, admittedly, neither of them is fully satisfactory. First,
though the Supreme Court clearly abrogated the Sony presumption of
unfairness in its Campbell majority opinion, the data show, as we will
see below, that lower courts continued to cite and apply that presump-
tion. Campbell's authority was and remains far from absolute. Second,
the drop-off in the proportion of bench trial opinions beginning in
the mid-1990s may reflect the influence not of the Supreme Court,
but of the circuit courts. The early 1990s saw a wave of circuit court
affirmances of summary judgment decisions in fair use cases. s This
trend may have emboldened district court judges and litigants to turn
more readily to summary adjudication.
3. Distribution of the Opinions by Subject Matter
Notwithstanding scholarly emphasis on fair use and new media,
traditional two-dimensional nonvirtual print media have dominated
and continue to dominate the facts of American fair use case law.
Over half (52.9%) of all of the opinions studied (and 50.7% of the
district court opinions) addressed facts in which both parties were en-
86 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583-84 (1994).
87 Id. at 589.
88 See, e.g., Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Handgun Control Fed'n, 15 F.3d 559, 560
(6th Cir. 1994); Twin Peaks Prods. v. Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1370-71 (2d
Cir. 1993); McGowan v. Cross, No. 92-1480, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 9134, at *1 (4th Cir.
Apr. 22, 1993); Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1079 (2d Cir. 1992); Wright v.
Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 733-34 (2d Cir. 1991); BellSouth Adver. & Publ'g
Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ'g, Inc., 933 F.2d 952, 955 (11th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 999
F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993); Cable/Home Commc'n Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902
F.2d 829, 834 (11th Cir. 1990).
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gaged in the nonvirtual print medium. 9 More specifically, 36.6% of
the opinions (and 31.3% of the district court opinions) addressed
facts in which both parties were engaged strictly in the medium of
nonvirtual text.9° Opinions addressing facts involving computer soft-
ware and/or Internet technology began to play a substantial, though
far from leading, role in the case law beginning in 1988. During the
period from 1988 through 2005, 21.6% of the opinions (and 22.6% of
the district court opinions) addressed facts involving computer soft-
ware and/or the Internet. Opinions addressing facts involving video,
broadly defined as moving images in television, motion picture, or
other form, constituted 20.6% of the opinions, while opinions involv-
ing music made up only 6.2% of those studied. Finally, 84.6% of the
opinions addressed facts in which both parties' works appeared in the
same medium. Where a shift in medium did occur, the most common
was from print to video or vice versa, which was reported in thirteen
(or 4.2%) of the opinions.
Unsurprisingly, First Amendment concerns figured prominently
in the opinions. 91 Twenty-five percent of the opinions invoked the
First Amendment or more general free speech concerns through the
course of the opinion, though not all did so within the fair use analysis
itself. Perhaps also unsurprisingly, the proportion of opinions ad-
dressing the First Amendment increased with the authority of the
court. Twenty percent of the district court opinions addressed the
First Amendment in some way, while 34% of the circuit court opinions
92
and 43% of the Supreme Court opinions did so.
89 Here, I broadly define the print medium as a medium consisting of two-
dimensional textual or graphic works on paper, canvas, or a similar substrate, but not
on a computer screen; the definition also excludes computer software code. Sixty-four
percent of the opinions, and 64% of the district court opinions specifically, addressed
facts in which at least one party was engaged in the print medium.
90 Forty-five percent of all opinions, and 43% of district court opinions, addressed
facts in which at least one party was engaged in nonvirtual text.
91 See generally Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment
Skein, 54 STAN. L. REv. 1 (2001) (arguing in favor of a more robust application of First
Amendment doctrine to copyright infringement claims); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Vo-
lokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998)
(arguing on First Amendment grounds that preliminary injunctions in certain copyright
cases are unconstitutional); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine
Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004) (arguing that a nar-
row conception of permissible fair use is a threat to First Amendment freedoms).
92 Here, a literal approach to "content analysis" of the case law does not serve us par-
ticularly well, or at least does not produce interesting data. Of the 69 opinions that ref-
erenced the First Amendment, 40.6% found in favor of the defendant, as opposed to the
237 opinions that did not reference the First Amendment, of which 42.2% found in favor
20081
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B. Reversal, Dissent, and Appeal Rates
The conventional wisdom is that "reversals and divided courts are
commonplace" in the fair use case law .93 "The field is littered," we are
told, "with the corpses of overturned opinions., 94 This is certainly
true of the Supreme Court fair use case law. In Sony, Harper & Row,
and Campbell, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit courts' reversals
of the district courts. 95 This, together with the fact that the Court was
divided five-four in Sony and six-three in Harper & Row, may ac-
count for the general belief that our fair use case law is especially un-
stable.
The data on the case law below the Supreme Court run contrary
to the conventional wisdom, however. The sample consisted of 88 cir-
cuit court opinions, of which 4 were concurrences and 13 were dis-
sents, from 71 cases. Of the 71 majority opinions, 24 reversed the dis-
trict court's fair use holding (for a reversal rate of 33.8%) and 10 met
with dissents on the fair use issue (for a dissent rate of 14.1%). 9s
These results are not substantially different from recent estimates of
overall circuit court reversal rates (for example, 32% across all circuits
for the period 1980-200299) and dissent rates (for example, 9.43%
of the defendant. Nor was it possible to conduct a reliable word count analysis of courts'
discussion of the First Amendment, as discussions of fair use and the First Amendment
tended to be quite discursive in nature. Here, then, a qualitative, leading cases approach
seems to be the only workable method of analysis currently available to us.
93 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1106-07
(1990) (footnotes omitted).
94 Weinreb, supra note 19, at 1137.
95 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 571-72 (1994), revg 972
F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 542 (1985), rev'k723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 420-21 (1984), rev' 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981); see also
Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in a Changing World, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 133, 134
(2003) (discussing the "indeterminacy" of fair usejudgments).
96 Sony, 464 U.S. at 418.
97 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 541.
98 Two cases produced dissents from en banc hearings. See Princeton Univ. Press
v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1393-94 (6th Cir. 1996) (Boyce, C.J.,
dissenting); id. at 1394-97 (Merritt, J., dissenting); id. at 1397-1412 (Ryan, J., dissent-
ing); New Era Publ'ns Int'l, APS v. Henry Holt, Co., 884 F.2d 659, 662-64 (2d Cir.
1989) (Newman,J., dissenting).
99 Kevin M. Scott, Understanding Judicial Hierarchy: Reversals and the Behavior of In-
ternediate Appellate Judges, 40 LAW & Soc'7 REv. 163, 177 tbl.1 (2006); see also Burton
Atkins, Interventions and Power in Judicial Hierarchies: Appellate Courts in England and the
United States, 24 I\w & Soc'Y REV. 71, 83-92 (1990) (comparing reversal rates in U.S.
appellate courts to those in English appellate courts).
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across all circuits for published opinions during the period 1970-
1988' 0 0)-and the circuit court reversal rate in fair use cases is well be-
low estimates of Federal Circuit reversal rates in patent cases (for ex-
ample, 47.3% for the period January 1998 through April 2000101).
Nor are the appellate data particularly exceptional when viewed from
the perspective of district court opinions. Of the 211 district court
opinions, 53 were appealed (for an unexceptional appeal rate of
25.1%102), with 35 of the 211 (or 16.6%) affirmed and 18 (or 8.5%)
reversed. °0 Overall, these data support the unexpected, if also per-
haps somewhat uninspiring, finding that our fair use case law, at least
outside of the cases that reached the Supreme Court (and our case-
books), has not been marked by especially high reversal, dissent, or
appeal rates.
C. Fair Use Win Rates
How often have courts actually found fair use in our section 107 case
law? The fair use win rate results are among the most curious in this
study. I first set out the basic results and then attempt some explanations.
Tables 3 and 4 report the fair use win rate results in the district
court and circuit court opinions, respectively. More specifically, Table
3 reports the proportion of unreversed district court opinions,
grouped by circuit and posture, that either found fair use or, in the
case of summaryjudgment motions by the plaintiff, found no fair use.
Overall, 30.4% of the preliminary injunction opinions found fair use,
while 24.1% of the bench trial opinions did so. Among summary
100 DONALD R. SONGER ET AL., CONTINUrIY AND CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES
COURTS OF APPEALS 105 tbl.5.1 (2000); see also Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro, Institutional
Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Minority Representation Under Panel Decision Making, 20
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 299, 306 (2004) ("Empirically, federal appellate panels are overwhelm-
ingly unanimous, with dissent rates aggregated across all circuits averaging approximately
6% to 8%, varying somewhat with respect to issue area." (citations omitted)).
to] Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction
Trends, 16 BERKELEYTECH. L.J. 1075, 1098 (2001); see also Stephen P. Swinton & Adam
A. Welland, Patent Injunction Reform and the Overlooked Problem of 'False Positives,' 70 BNA
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 337, 338 (2005) ("Depending on the analysis em-
ployed and period examined, reversal rates for trial court judgments in patent in-
fringement cases range from 30 to more than 60 percent.").
102 See Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Nontried Cases: Fur-
therExploration of Anti-Plaintff Appellate Outcomes, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 659, 664 &
tbl.1 (2004) (noting a 10.9% appeal rate for all district court cases and a 21% appeal rate
for all district court cases with ajudgment for plaintiff or defendant from 1987 to 1996).
103 Of the 18 district court opinions that were reversed, 9 found in favor of the
plaintiff and 9 found in favor of the defendant.
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judgment opinions, 86.4% of the opinions that addressed a plaintiffs
uncrossed motion for summary judgment granted that motion, while
75.7% of the opinions that addressed a defendant's uncrossed motion
for summary judgment granted that motion. The parties' win rates
were sharply lower for cross-motions for summary judgment. As Table
4 reports, the fair use win rate results in the circuit court majority
opinions are roughly comparable to those in the district court opin-
ions, but as a matter of statistical significance, none of the circuit
court results deviated significantly from 50%.
Considering first the district court results, it should not be surprising
that a high proportion of district court opinions addressing an uncrossed
summary judgment motion granted the motion. As an empirical matter,
these results are consistent with similar results from a study of the multifac-
tor test for consumer confusion in U.S. trademark cases.1 04 As a theoretical
matter, parties are less likely to incur the costs of filing a motion for sum-
mary judgment where the motion lacks merit, opposing parties are more
likely to file a cross-motion where they have a reasonably strong case, and
district court judges are more likely to write published opinions when they
grant rather than deny motions for summary judgment.
This still leaves open the question of the exceptionally low fair use
win rates in district court preliminary injunction and bench trial opin-
ions. The Priest-Klein "selection hypothesis" predicts that, given various
conditions, plaintiff win rates at trial should approach 50%, largely be-
cause it is only the close cases that survive settlement-or summary ad-
judication.105 Evidence of the fifty-percent hypothesis has been mixed
at best.1 0 6 The fundamental assumption limiting the fifty-percent hy-
pothesis, and the data that have been mustered to support it, is that the
parties must have equal stakes in the litigation for it to be true.' °7
104 Beebe, supra note 14, at 1596-98 & tbl.2 (2006).
105 George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 4-6, 17-18 (1984).
106 See generally Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Frame-
work with Empirical Tests, 19J. LEGAL STUD. 337 (1990) (testing the fifty-percent hypothesis
and rejecting it as a description of all civil litigation); Daniel Kessler et al., Explaining Devia-
tions from the FifyPercent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25 J.
LEGAL STUD. 233 (1996) (noting deviations from the fifty-percent hypothesis as a result of
cases that do not conform to the assumptions of Priest and Klein's model).
107 Priest & Klein, supra note 105, at 24-29.
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Yet, as William Landes has argued, intellectual property plaintiffs tend
to be parties with higher stakes because they face the risk that an ad-
verse judgment will limit or extinguish their rights. 08 We would there-
fore expect intellectual property plaintiffs to settle even the near-close
cases, Landes argues, with the result that plaintiff win rates in intellec-
tual property cases that make it to trial should exceed 50% by a com-
fortable margin. '9 Landes finds strong support for this hypothesis in
Federal Judicial Center data showing, for example, a 73% copyright
plaintiff trial win rate in federal district courts for the years 1978-2000,
as against a 48% plaintiff trial win rate for civil trials generally."0
The high plaintiff win rates in the district court preliminary in-
junction and bench trial opinions are certainly consistent with Lan-
des's more general hypothesis and the evidence he presents in sup-
port of it. Yet the Landes hypothesis runs counter to the conventional
view among commentators (including myself) of plaintiffs in fair use
litigation, if not of copyright owners more generally." This view
holds that in our "clearance culture, " "' owners of valuable copyright-
able expression quite rationally tend to be very aggressive litigants,
and not simply because they expose themselves to the defenses of ac-
quiescence or laches if they are not. More importantly, they have a
stake in establishing a reputation for being aggressive litigants in order
108 William M. Landes, An Empirical Analysis of Intellectual Property Litigation: Some
Preliminary Results, 41 HOUS. L. REv. 749, 772 (2004).
109 Id.
110 Id. at 774 tbl.5. The Federal Judicial Center data are highly suspect. See gener-
ally Beebe, supra note 14, at 1652-54 (noting various problems with the reliability of
Administrative Office data); Theodore Eisenberg & Margo Schlanger, The Reliability of
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts Database: An Initial Empirical Analysis, 78 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1455 (2003) (same).
I Cf Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copyright, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
U.S.A. 1, 1 (1997) ("It has become fashionable, among some thinkers and activists in
copyright and related fields, to disparage or to deplore copyright protection."). See
generally Jane C. Ginsburg, How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 61 (2002) (discussing overreaching by copyright owners, but defending certain
new media copyright reforms).
112 See generally PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA,
UNTOLD STORIES: CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIGHTS CLEARANCE CULTURE FOR
DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS (2004), available at http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/
rock/backgrounddocs/printablerightsreport.pdf (documenting the effect of a rights
acquisition "thicket" on filmmakers' creative experiences); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE
CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE
AND CONTROL CREATIV1TY (2005), available at http://www.freeculture.cc/
freeculture.pdf (arguing that media companies use copyright law to stifle culture and
creativity).
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to benefit from the "chilling effects" that such a reputation may gen-
erate.113 These forces may play out largely at the cease-and-desist stage
of fair use disputes,1 1 4 but we expect them to play a role in the plain-
tiff's decision to litigate rather than settle as well.
It is important to emphasize that the data set collected for this
study cannot tell us whether the plaintiffs in the opinions sampled
conform to the conventional viewjust outlined. But I want to take ad-
vantage of this view to open the door to a different and tentative ex-
planation for the low fair use win rates in district court preliminary in-
junction and bench trial opinions. This explanation assumes that
some defendants who are otherwise committed to defending against a
copyright infringement claim on grounds such as copyrightability or
substantial similarity may find it relatively inexpensive also to plead a
fair use defense, even when the defense may be frivolous or at least
very weak in light of the facts. Because conscientious judges will duti-
fully consider each of the four factors, as section 107 instructs them to
do, even when the outcome of the fair use test is obvious, opinions
addressing even essentially extraneous fair use defenses will have
come within those sampled for this study. This would drive down
overall fair use win rates.
The problem is how objectively to determine whether an opinion
addressed a frivolous fair use defense. There is no good way to do so.
However, one reasonably workable quantitative index of the weakness
or marginality of the defendant's fair use defense may be the propor-
tion of the opinion-in words-that the judge devoted to the defense.
We would expect that, as a general matter, opinions that addressed a
frivolous fair use defense would devote a smaller proportion of the
opinion to that defense, while opinions that addressed a claim of fair
use that was at least reasonable would spend more time analyzing the
defense. Consider, then, Figure 4, which presents a histogram of all
306 opinions distributed according to the proportion of the word count
of the opinion devoted to the fair use defense. The figure also reports
the defendant win rates for opinions falling within each bin of the his-
togram. As expected, there is a clear and fairly steady positive relation
between the proportion of an opinion devoted to the fair use defense
113 See generally Chilling Effects Clearinghouse, http://www.chillingeffects.org (last
visited January 20, 2008) (providing background material and legal explanations for
people who receive cease-and-desist letters claiming intellectual property violations).
114 See id. (providing a database of cease-and-desist letters sent by intellectual
property holders to web publishers).
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and the likelihood that the opinion ultimately ruled in favor of the de-
fendant on the fair use issue. Indeed, if we exclude the 42 opinions
that devoted less than 10% of the opinion to the fair use issue (which
are represented in the two leftmost bins), we quickly come to a very re-
spectable defendant win rate in the remaining opinions of 45.5%. To
be sure, this is not a comprehensive explanation of the low preliminary
injunction and bench trial win rates reported in Table 3, but it may ac-
count for at least some of the sub-50% nature of the results.
Figure 4: Distribution of Opinions by Proportion of
Word Count Devoted to Fair Use Analysis and
Fair Use Win Rate in Those Opinions
(n= 306)
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Two final issues deserve mention with respect to the fair use win
rate results. First, the far more moderate win rates at the circuit court
level, none of them statistically significantly different from 50%, are
fully consistent with the underlying logic of the Priest-Klein selection
hypothesis. Second, though the data set is not large enough to make
strong claims about intercircuit variation in fair use win rates, it is re-
markable to note that the district courts of the Seventh Circuit did not
find fair use in any of their 10 unreversed opinions, while the district
courts of the Second Circuit did not find fair use in any of their 9 un-
reversed bench trial opinions. Meanwhile, only 2 of the 11 unreversed
preliminary injunction opinions from the district courts of the Ninth
Circuit found fair use.
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III. INTERFACTOR ANALYSIS
I turn now to the main focus of this study: howjudges use the four-
factor test set forth in section 107 to adjudicate the fair use defense. To
begin this analysis, I first consider here how the factor outcomes inter-
acted with one another and with the overall test outcome in the opin-
ions. I also consider the extent to which judges stampeded the factors
to conform to the overall test outcome. This will prepare the ground
for the analysis in the next Part of what subfactor considerations influ-
enced specific factor outcomes as well as the overall test outcome.
A. Correlation and Regression Analysis
In practice, which factor or factors drive the outcome of the sec-
tion 107 test? This question has produced an enormous amount of
speculation. Each factor, it seems, has its champions and its detrac-
tors, 1 5 though most courts and commentators assume that, in prac-
tice, the outcome of the section 107 test relies primarily on the out-
come of the fourth factor," 6 which calls for an economic analysis of
the effect of the defendant's use on the market for the plaintiffs
work. Indeed, the Harper & Row Court called the fourth factor "un-
115 On the first factor, see Hofheinz v. Discovery Communications, Inc., No. 00-
3802, 2001 WL 1111970, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2001) ("[T]his first and foremost fac-
tor strongly favors defendant."), On Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 174 (2d Cir.
2001) (Leval,J.) (referring to the first factor as "[t]he heart of the fair use inquiry");
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1121 (C.D. Cal. 1999) ("The first factor
of the fair use test is the most important in this case."), rev'd in part, 336 F.3d 811 (9th
Cir. 2003), and Leval, supra note 93, at 1116 (stating that "Factor One is the soul of fair
use"). On the second factor, see Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,
471 U.S. 539, 553 (1985) (referring to the second factor as "highly relevant to whether
a given use is fair"), and Cable/Home Commc'n Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902
F.2d 829, 844 (11th Cir. 1990) ("This factor is 'highly relevant to whether a given use is
fair."' (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 553)). But see Dow Jones & Co. v. Bd. of
Trade, 546 F. Supp. 113, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("The nature of the copyrighted work
seems to be the least important and most unclear of the four factors enumerated in §
107."); Carroll, supra note 9, at 18 (arguing that factor two "tends to do little work in
swaying the outcome" of the test); Sag, supra note 9, at 390 ("The nature of the copy-
righted work, while fairly objective, nonetheless remains unhelpful in assessing
whether an activity is protected by fair use or not because it is overwhelmed by the
other factors."). On the third factor, see Compaq Computer Corp. v. Procom Tech.,
Inc., 908 F. Supp. 1409, 1421 (S.D. Tex. 1995) ("The third factor.., is generally con-
sidered the least important factor of the fair use analysis." (citing Sony Corp v. Univer-
sal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 449-50 (1984)).
16 See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 12, at 267 n.25 ("My own opinion is that the fourth
factor is the most important.").
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doubtedly the single most important element of fair use."117  The
Campbell Court subsequently tried to overwrite that dictum, " 8 but with
only limited success, as we will see in the next Part. Commentators
tend further to assume that, in practice, the outcomes of the first fac-
tor (concerning the purpose and character of the defendant's use)
and the fourth factor often coincide-so often, in fact, that several
commentators have expressed concern about courts' "double count-
ing" the same considerations under the two factors." 9 This concern is
based on the nature of the doctrine informing the first and fourth fac-
tor analyses. If a court finds that the defendant's use is "transforma-
tive" or "noncommercial" under factor one, and that factor one there-
fore favors the defendant, a court will also likely find that the
defendant's use, precisely because it is transformative or noncommer-
cial, will not adversely affect the market for the plaintiff's work. The
expected result is that factor four will also favor the defendant. 1° The
inverse is thought to hold as well, particularly if a court finds that the
defendant's use is "commercial" under factor one. This is because the
Sony Court established that a use found to be commercial under factor
one is presumptively harmful to the market for plaintiffs work under
factor four.1 2' The Campbell Court also tried to overwrite-or at least
modify-this dictum, 22 again with little success, as we will see in the
next Part. As for factors two and three (concerning the nature of the
plaintiffs work and the quantitative and qualitative extent of the de-
fendant's taking, respectively), commentators tend to regard these, if
they regard them at all, as peripheral to the outcome of the test.121
117 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566.
118 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994) ("All [factors]
are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copy-
right.").
119 Fisher, supra note 7, at 1672-73; see also Jeremy Kudon, Form Over Function: Ex-
panding the Transformativeness Use Test for Fair Use, 80 B.U. L. REv. 579, 605 (2000) ("Essen-
tially, the court incorporated the fourth factor's analysis into the first factor's test.").
120 See, e.g., NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 485 (2d Cir. 2004) ("As
Campbell pointed out, these inquiries, specified in the first and fourth listed factors of
§ 107, are correlated: the greater the transformative purpose of the secondary use, the
less potential purchasers will see it as an alternative means of acquiring the original.").
121 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984) ("If
the intended use is for commercial gain, [the] likelihood [of significant market harm]
may be presumed.").
:22 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591.
23 See supra note 115 (discussing the comparative importance of each factor). But
see Leval, supra note 93, at 1123 ("[The third factor] plays a role in consideration of
justification under the first factor (the purpose and character of the secondary use);
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Correlation analysis provides one simple means to test the conven-
tional wisdom on the relative importance of and interactions among
the fair use factors. Table 5 reports the correlation coefficients for the
relations between each of the factor outcomes and the overall test
outcome, as well as among each of the factor outcomes in the 297 dis-
positive opinions studied, regardless of posture.124 These results show
that the outcomes of factors one and four very strongly correlated
with the test outcome and fairly strongly correlated with each other,
while the outcome of factor two correlated weakly, if at all, with the
outcome of the test and with the outcomes of the other factors. Fac-
tor three did better than factor two with respect to the overall test
outcome, but the strength of its correlations with the outcomes of fac-
tors one and four was not impressive. 
1 25
Putting these coefficients in perhaps more easily understood and
starker terms, the outcome of factor four coincided with the outcome
of the overall test in 83.8% of the 297 dispositive opinions while the
outcome of factor one coincided with the outcome of the overall test
in 81.5% of these same opinions. By comparison, the outcome of fac-
tor two coincided with the outcome of the overall test in 50.2% of
these opinions. As for the combined influence of factors one and
four, in 214 (or 72.1%) of the opinions, factors one and four either
both favored or both disfavored fair use. In all but one of these opin-
ions,126 the outcome of the fair use test followed the outcome of these
two factors. What happened when, if ever, factor one favored (or dis-
favored) fair use while factor four disfavored (or favored) fair use?
Did one of these leading factors consistently trump the other? Factors
one and four pointed in opposite directions in only 20 of the opin-
ions. In 14 of these opinions, the outcome of the test followed the
outcome of factor four, while in 6, the outcome of the test followed
and it can assist in the assessment of the likely impact on the market for the copy-
righted work under the fourth factor (the effect on the market).").
124 Note that the sum of the absolute values of the two correlation coefficients
shown for each factor does not equal zero because the court could also have found the
factor to be neutral, not relevant, or a fact issue, or the court's finding was unclear.
For this correlation analysis, each factor outcome is represented with two binary vari-
ables: favors a finding of fair use (1 = yes, 0 = no) and disfavors a finding of fair use (1
= yes, 0 = no). Thus, if the first variable is coded as one, then the second variable will
be coded as zero, and vice versa. But if the court found the factor to be neutral, irrele-
vant, or not argued, then both variables were coded as zero.
125 There was no significant variation over time in the strength of the correlations.
See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp.
1231, 1242-50 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (finding no fair use where factors two and three disfa-
vored fair use while factors one and four favored fair use).
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the outcome of factor one. Though hardly conclusive, this breakdown
is consistent with the conventional view that factor four exerts the
stronger influence on the outcome of the test.
Table 5: Correlations Between a Finding of
Fair Use and the Factor Outcomes and Among the
Factor Outcomes in 297 Dispositive Opinions
FU
Found/
SJ-P
Denied
Factor One
Dis-
favors
Factor Two
Dis-
favors
Factor Three
Dis-
favors
Factor Four
Dis-Favors favors
FU Found/
SJ-P Denied
Factor Favors
One Disfavors
Factor Favors
Two Disfavors
Factor Favors
Three Disfavors
Factor Favors
Four Disfavors
1.000
.747* 1.000
-. 780* -.735* 1.000
.321* .310* -. 192* 1.000
-.281* -0.087 .267* -.491* 1.000
.646* .559* -.496* .339* -.190* 1.000
-.680* -.471* .631* -.146* .370* -.630* 1.000
.823* .713* -.616* .364* -.174* .637* -.504* 1.000
-.806* -.557* .673* -.205* .331* -.474* .688* -. 722* 1.000
"FU Found/SJ-P Denied" denotes that the court found fair use or otherwise denied the plain-
tiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue. "Favors" denotes outcomes in which the fac-
tor was found to favor fair use. "Disfavors" denotes outcomes in which the factor was found to
disfavor fair use. * denotes that the coefficient is statistically significant at the .05 level.
Table 6 reports the results of logistic regression analysis of an
overall finding of fair use as a function of the outcomes of each of the
four factors in the 297 dispositive opinions. The regression model
used here is highly stylized in that, first, it specifies the factor out-
comes in the form of trinary explanatory variables-coded as favors
fair use (1), disfavors fair use (-1), and other (0)-and second, it does
not include interaction variables. Nevertheless, this very rudimentary
model correctly classified 95.6% of the test outcomes. The regression
results are consistent with conventional wisdom and with the results of
20081
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correlation analysis. Controlling for the effects of the other three fac-
tors, the first and fourth factors are shown each to exert an enormous
amount of influence on the outcome of the test, with the fourth very
much in the driver's seat, while factor two is shown to exert no signifi-
cant effect on the test outcome.
Table 6: Logistic Regression of the Outcome of the
Fair Use Test as a Function of the Outcomes of the
Section 107 Factors in 297 Dispositive Opinions
Dependent variable: Fair Use Found (1) n = 297
Fair Use Not Found (0) Psuedo R = .872
Log likelihood = -25.950 Correctly Classified: 95.6%
Odds Standard
Ratio Coefficient Error P>IZ 95% C.I.
Factor One 15.005" 2.708* .683 .000 1.370 4.047
Factor Two 2.702 .994 .772 .198 -.519 2.507
Factor Three 7.339* 1.993" .743 .007 .538 3.449
Factor Four 39.167* 3.668* .829 .000 2.043 5.293
Constant .198 .389 .610 -.565 .962
* denotes statistical significance at the .05 level.
But perhaps the main teaching of this simple model is that we ulti-
mately learn very little from evaluating the section 107 test at so abstract
a level as that of the factor outcomes. It is certainly interesting to ob-
serve, now based on empirical evidence, that the outcome of the fourth
factor appears to drive the outcome of the test, and that the outcome of
the first factor also appears to be highly influential. But of course these
findings beg the question of what subfactor considerations lead judges
to conclude that the fourth or first factors-or the second or third, for
that matter-favored or disfavored fair use. This is the subject of Part
V. Before turning to these intrafactor concerns, however, and as fur-
ther background for their consideration, I consider two final interfactor
questions: to which factors do judges devote the bulk of their written
analysis and to what extent do the factors stampede?
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B. Word Count Analysis
Because judges tended to conduct their section 107 analyses in a
highly methodical and explicit manner, it was a relatively simple task
to establish in the opinions where their discussion of one factor ended
and that of another began. This in turn facilitated the analysis of the
word count of each opinion devoted to the discussion of a particular
factor as a proportion of the word count of the opinion devoted to the
overall discussion of the fair use issue. The results of this analysis are
reported in Table 7 and Figure 5.
Table 7: Mean Proportion of Fair Use Discussion
Devoted to Each Factor in 306 Fair Use Opinions
Mean Std. Dev. Min/Max
Factor One .23 .16 .00/.72
Factor Two .09 .09 .00/.61
Factor Three .11 .09 .00/.67
Factor Four .20 .15 .00/.67
By their terms, none of the factors necessarily call for more writ-
ten analysis than the others, and, as the standard deviations reported
in Table 7 suggest, the opinions varied widely in how much attention
each devoted to certain factors. Yet, as Table 7 shows, for the 306
opinions, judges tended to devote a far greater share of their discus-
sions of the fair use issue to analyses under factors one and four than
to those under factors two and three. If we accept that in explaining
(or defending) their analysis of a legal issue, judges are generally
more likely to dedicate a greater share of their explanations to con-
siderations that they deem to be more important, then these results
lend further support to the finding that, in practice, the first and
fourth factors-or more specifically, the subfactors considered under
them-drive the outcome of the test.
Figure 5 depicts judges' proportional attention to each factor across
time. Most interesting is the story of the first factor. The Sony presump-
tion that commercial uses are presumptively unfair 2 7 likely accounts for
the early rise in proportional attention to factor one. This attention
then decreased and factor four rose to prominence until Judge Pierre
Leval's 1990 Harvard Law Review article, Toward a Fair Use Standard,
127 See discussion infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing Justice Stevens's creation of this
commercial use presumption).
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urged courts to attend more closely to the question of transformative-128
ness. In 1994, the Campbell Court cited to and amplified judge Leval's
teaching,' 9 which very likely gave rise to factor one's golden age in the
late 1990s. We then see a fairly precipitous drop-off in attention to fac-
tor one, which continued through 2005. What is remarkable is not so
much that judges' proportional attention to factor one increased after
Sony and then again after Campbell. Rather, it is that this proportional
attention repeatedly subsided. First the commerciality inquiry and then
the transformativeness inquiry came into and then fell out of fashion.
Of this I will have more to say in the next Part.
Figure 5: Twenty-Opinion Moving Average of the
Proportion of Fair Use Discussion
Devoted to Each Factor
Harper & Row (1985)
0 Sony (1984)'/ Stewart (1990) Campbell (1994) jan 1., 2000
0.35 Factor One
0.3
.o Factor Four
'E, 0.25 ;'. ",,
0
0 0.2
t 0.15
0.1
0 Ln
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250 275 300
Opinion Number
C. Stampeding
The interfactor correlation coefficients in Table 5 show the de-
gree to which an individual factor outcome correlated with another
individual factor outcome. But to what extent did multiple factor out-
128 SeeLeval, supra note 93, at 1111 ("1 believe the answer to the question ofjustifi-
cation turns primarily on whether, and to what extent, the challenged use is transforma-
tive.").
1See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578-79 (1994) (citing to
judge Leval's explanation of why fair use factor one hinges on Transformativeness).
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comes correlate in the opinions? In other words, to what extent did
all or most of the factor outcomes tend to "stampede" in one or the
other direction? In a previous study ofjudges' use of the multifactor
test for trademark infringement, I found strong evidence that judges
tended to stampede the factors of that test. I argued that this revealed
the degree to which judges engaged in "coherence-based reasoning"
in applying that test.130 The conventional wisdom in copyright law is
that judges also stampede the factors of the fair use test. David Nim-
mer, the author of the authoritative copyright treatise, has argued this
in strong terms:
Courts tend first to make ajudgment that the ultimate disposition is fair
use or unfair use, and then align the four factors to fit that result as best
they can. At base, therefore, the four factors fail to drive the analysis,
but rather serve as convenient pegs on which to hang antecedent con-
clusions. 131
He further asserts, as an empirical matter, that 'judges who uphold
fair use almost always find that three, if not four, of the factors incline
in its favor; judges who deny the fair use defense almost always find
that three, if not four, of the factors incline against it.',
132
As is the case with respect to reversal rates in the fair use case law,
the conventional wisdom with respect to the degree to which courts
stampede the fair use factors appears to be based on two Supreme
Court cases: Sony and Harper & Row. Certainly, these cases show stam-
peding. In Sony, the district court found that three (or perhaps four)
factors favored fair use,13 3 while the Ninth Circuit found that all four
factors disfavored fair use. At the Supreme Court, the five-justice ma-
jority then found that all four factors favored fair use, 35 while the four
130 See Beebe, supra note 14, at 1615-17 ("[Coherence-based reasoning] hypothe-
sizes that the 'decision-making process progresses bi-directionally: premises and facts
both determine conclusions and are affected by them in return."' (quoting Simon, su-
pra note 14, at 511)).
131 Nimmer, supra note 12, at 281 (footnote ommited).
132 Id. at 280.
133 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 450-56
(C.D. Cal. 1979) (holding that home recording and playback of television programs "is
noncommercial and does not reduce the market for plaintiffs' works"), rev'd, 659 F.2d
963 (9th Cir. 1981).
13 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 972-74 (9th
Cir. 1981) ("It is our conviction that the fair use doctrine does not sanction home
videorecording."), rev'd sub nom. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417 (1984).
135 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454-55
(1984) ("When [the fair use] factors are all weighed in the 'equitable rule of reason'
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136dissenters found that all four factors disfavored fair use. Harper &
Row stampeded back and forth in essentially the same way.131
But what of the rest of the fair use case law? Figure 6 reports the dis-
tribution of "stampede scores" by posture and outcome among the dis-
trict court opinions. An opinion's stampede score is the sum of the fac-
tors that the opinion found to favor a finding of fair use minus the sum of
the factors that it found to disfavor a finding of fair use. Thus, a stam-
pede score of -4 indicates that the opinion found all four factors to disfa-
vor fair use, while a score of, say, -2 indicates that the opinion found one
factor to favor and three factors to disfavor fair use. Figure 6 makes clear
that, regardless of posture, judges do not generally stampede the factors
when they find fair use. For example, judges found that all four factors
favored a finding of fair use in only 1 out of 15 preliminary injunction
opinions and 3 out of 12 bench trial opinions.
In opinions in which judges found no fair use, however, the data
are more open to interpretation. Judges found that all four factors
disfavored fair use in 40.0% of the preliminary injunction opinions
and 44.0% of the 25 bench trial opinions that found no fair use. Of
the cross-motion opinions that found no fair use, 58.5% found that all
four factors favored that result. The problem with these data is that
we cannot be sure how many of these opinions addressed frivolous fair
use defenses that fully merited a -4 stampede score. Indeed, one in-
dex of the frivolousness of the defense, particularly in the cross-
motion context, may be the stampede score itself. Yet the data
showed no relation between the degree of stampeding in an opinion
and, if we accept it as an alternative index of the strength or weakness
of the fair use defense, the proportion of that opinion devoted to the
defense. 131 In any event, even on their face, these percentages are not
balance, we must conclude that this record amply supports the District Court's conclu-
sion that home time-shifting is fair use.").
1 See id. at 486 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[T]ime-shifting cannot be deemed a
fair use.").
137 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560-69 (1985)
(finding that all four factors disfavored fair use over the dissent's objection that all four
factors favored fair use), rev' 723 F.2d 195, 207-08, 214-16 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding that
all four factors favored fair use, with the dissent finding that at least two factors disfa-
vored fair use), rev'g557 F. Supp. 1067, 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (finding that all four fac-
tors disfavored fair use); see also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 590-605 (Brennan & Meskill,
JJ., dissenting).
1 A histogram like that in Figure 4, but indicating the mean of the absolute value
of the opinions' stampede scores, rather than their fair use win rate, would show a flat
stampede score line running across the bins.
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so high as to support the claim that, in practice, the factors "tend to
degenerate into post-hoc rationales for antecedent conclusions." 9 On
the contrary, at least outside of the cross-motion context, the majority
of district court opinions that found no fair use were willing to ac-
knowledge, as were opinions that found fair use, that at least one fac-
tor, and sometimes more, did not support the overall test outcome. 140
Finally, from the 215 cases that produced the opinions studied, 32
cases produced both a district court opinion and a circuit court opin-
ion that reviewed the fair use reasoning of the district court opinion.
For these 32 cases, Table 8 cross-tabulates the stampede score of the
district court opinion with the stampede score of the reviewing circuit
court majority opinion. In the 15 cases in which the circuit court re-
versed the district court on the fair use issue, the difference between
the two courts' stampede scores was in certain instances fairly dra-
matic. Yet in 11 of these 15 cases, neither the district nor the circuit
court opinions yielded stampede scores with absolute values of 3 or 4.
In other words, in these 11 cases, both the district and the circuit
courts, even when reversing, declined fully or even partially to con-
form their factor analysis to the overall test outcome. Meanwhile, in 9
of the 17 cases in which the circuit court affirmed the district court,
the circuit court did not call the factors as the district court had.
Here, again, we see no evidence of any strong inclination on the part
of the circuit courts to bend the factor outcomes one way or the other.
Rather, they appear simply to have called the factors as they saw them.
139 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05, at 13-
206 (2007).
140 As one plausible explanation for this finding, the subfactor doctrine under each
of the four factors may play a role in limiting courts' ability to stampede the factor out-
comes. It is well recognized that the statutory language of the section 107 factors is am-
biguous. See supra note 11. This might facilitate stampeding. See Dan Simon, A Psycho-
logical Model of Judicial Decision Makin& 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 101 (1998) ("Ambiguous
propositions are malleable and thus especially susceptible to restructuring."); id. at 101
n.387 (citing multiple empirical studies showing the malleability of ambiguous proposi-
tions). However, the subfactor doctrine is arguably far more specific and less open to
manipulation, and as Part IV, infra, shows, certain subfactor doctrines significantly influ-
ence the outcomes of the factors and the overall test.
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Table 8: Cross-Tabulation of the Stampede Scores of Appealed
District Court Opinions by the Stampede Scores of the Reviewing
Circuit Court Decisions, in 32 Fair Use Cases
Stampede Score of Reviewing Circuit Court Opinion
Stampede Score
of Appealed
District Court
Opinion
-4 4 1 1 1 1
-3 1 1 1 I
-2 1 2 1
-1 1t
0 i 1
1
2 1 2 2
3 1 1 1
The number in each box of the cross-tabulation indicates the number of cases producing
a district court opinion and an appellate court majority opinion meeting the values of the x
and y coordinates of the cross-tabulation. For example, 4 cases produced district court and
appellate court majority opinions that both yielded stampede scores of -4. Underlined
numbers indicate the number of cases in which the appellate court reversed the district court.
In Association of American Medical Colleges v. Cuomo, 928 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1991), the
Second Circuit reversed the district court's granting of summary judgment to the plaintiff in
Association ofAmerican Medical Colleges v. Carey, 728 F. Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
In Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Congress Int'l, Inc., 241 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2001), the Fifth
Circuit reversed the district court's granting of summary judgment to the defendant in Veeck
v. S. Bldg. Code Congress Int'l, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 885 (E.D. Tex. 1999).
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Preliminary lnjumction Opinions
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
SJ-Plaintiff Opinions
5 -
0 i
Fl -~
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
- Opinions finding no
fair use
_ 1 Opinions finding
fair use
Stampede score = (number of
factors favoring fair use) -
(number of factors disfavoring
fair use)
Bench Trial Opinions
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
SJ-Defendant Opinions
4 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
SJ-Cross Opinions
20 -.
15
0
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Three district court opinions were excluded from the sample used to construct this
figure. See Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of Trustees v. Substance, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 919, 930-34
(N.D. II. 2000) (denying a motion to dismiss on a stampede score of -4); Int-Elect Eng'g,
Inc. v. Clinton Harley Corp., No. 92-20718, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11510, at *5-6 (S.D. Cal.
June 24, 1993) (denying a motion to dismiss on a stampede score of-i); Roy Export Co. Es-
tablishment of Vaduz, Liecht., Black Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137,
1143-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (denying the defendant's motion forjudgment notwithstanding the
verdict on a stampede score of-4).
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Figure 6: Distribution of Four-Factor Stampede
Scores by Outcome and Posture
in 208 District Court Opinions*
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IV. INTRAFACTOR ANALYSIS
Having established in previous Parts a macro view of the section 107
test and the factors that structure it, I seek in this Part to look within the
factors themselves to determine which subfactor considerations drive
the outcomes of the factors, and through these factor outcomes, the
outcome of the overall test. To aid in this inquiry, Table 9 sets out the
results of a logistic regression model of the outcome of the fair use test
as a function of (1) a variety of factual findings made by judges in the
297 dispositive opinions, 14 and (2) whether the opinion was written by--- • 142
a district or circuit court of the Second or the Ninth Circuits. The re-
sults of this model, which correctly classified 85.1% of the 297 opinion
outcomes, suggest a number of surprising hypotheses that will merit
closer investigation in what follows.
Through the course of this primarily descriptive account, this Part
will also consider a number of more theoretical (or at least generaliz-
able) themes. One theme might be termed "the irony of the inverted
precedent." We will see repeatedly that though the Supreme Court es-
tablished, for example, that a finding of "x" disfavors fair use, the Court
said nothing about a finding of "not x." The irony is that in the case law
that followed, a finding of "x" appeared to have no significant effect on
a court's fair use determination, but a finding of "not x" ended up ex-
erting a significant effect in favor of a determination of fair use. 143 This
irony has played out in a number of areas of subfactor doctrine.
A second general theme involves the "nonergodicity" of the opera-
tion of legal precedent in the fair use case law.144 The system-theoretic
concept of nonergodicity posits that as a system develops, small, even
141 On the problem of the "circularity of facts" in judicial opinions, see Hall &
Wright, supra note 13, at 18-21.
142 Table 9 suggests that, controlling for all other variables listed in the table, defen-
dants had a significantly better chance of prevailing in their fair use defense in a district
or circuit court of the Second Circuit than in the courts of any of the other circuits.
143 See infra text accompanying notes 158-164.
144 Cf Johan Deprez, Comment, Risk, Uncertainty, and Nonergodicity in the Deternina-
tion of Investment-Backed Expectations: A Post Keynesian Alternative to Posnerian Doctrine in
the Analysis of Regulatory Takings, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1221, 1223-24 (2001) (applying
economic theories of ergodicity and nonergodicity to regulatory takings doctrine). See
generally Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IowA L. REv. 601 (2001) (employing path depend-
ence theory to assess the evolution of the common law).
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Table 9: Logistic Regression of the Outcome of the
Fair Use Test as a Function of Factual Findings in
297 Dispositive Opinions
Dependent variable: Fair Use Found (1)
Fair Use Not Found (0)
Log likelihood = -116.341
Factual Finding
D's use is for
FOr commercial
One
purpose
D's use is for
noncommer-
cial use
D's use is trans-
formative use
D's use is for
parodic
purpose
D's use is for
educational
purpose
D's use is for re-
search purpose
D's use is for
critical
purpose
D accessed P's
work
improperly
D's use is bad
faith use
Factor P's work is a crea-
Two tive work
P's work is a fac-
tual work
P's work is un-
published
P's work is pub-
lished
Factor D took entirety
Three of P's work
D took heart of
P's work
Litigated in Sec-
ond Circuit
Litigated in
Ninth Circuit
Constant
Odds
Ratio
Standard
Coefficient trdError P>IZI
n 297
Pseudo R = .425
Correctly Classified: 85.14%
95% C.I.
.702 -.353 .403 .381 -1.143 .437
9.466*
33.572*
2.248 .580
3.514 .843
1.111 3.385
1.861 5.167
11.215* 2.417 .930 .009 .594 4.241
-.976 .701 .164
.233 .680 .731
-2.349 0.398
-1.099 1.566
.314 .681 .645 -1.020 1.648
3.761 1.325 .779
.116 -2.150 1.156
.402*
2.979*
1.031*
3.631*
-.912 .406
1.091 .484
.031 .569
1.290 .611
.247* -1.399 .409
.018* -4.019 .945
2.348*
1.993
.853 .428 .046
.690 .442 .119
-.202 2.851
-4.416 .115
-1.707 -.117
.142 2.041
-1.084 1.146
.092 2.487
-2.201 -.597
-5.870 -2.167
.014 1.693
-.177 1.557
-.622 .385 .107 -1.377 .134
* Denotes statistical significance at the .05 level.
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trivial, initial events may end up having an enormous impact on the
system in the long run.14  In the fair use context, the initial events
were Supreme Court dicta that ended up powerfully changing the
course of our fair use doctrine. Related to this is the theme of the
perdurability of overturned legal precedent. Even after the Supreme
Court sought to correct its initial mistakes, lower courts continued to
cite to those mistakes, particularly when they supported the outcome
that the lower court reached.
Finally, and related in turn to the perdurability of overturned
precedent, this Part will consider the operation of "syntactic" versus
"cybernetic" feedback 46 in the context of accumulating precedent. 147
This terminology, taken from communications theory, is infelicitous,
but it is very important to understanding why our fair use doctrine has
to some extent run off the rails of section 107. The Supreme Court
has sought to correct its mistakes in its fair use case law primarily by
means of "syntactic feedback." Rather than admit that its initial com-
munication was inapposite to the world it meant to describe (through
cybernetic feedback), the Court has invariably stated that lower courts
have simply misunderstood its initial communication (providing syn-
148tactic feedback). In other words, the Court has repeatedly sought to
145 See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 144, at 629 ("[T]he increasing returns nature of the
common law system has three predictable consequences. The first is nonergodicity-
small early events have a large impact on the eventual outcome. Because judges cannot
fully anticipate the ways in which public and private actors will react to their decisions,
they have difficulty determining the likely effect of their decisions over time. For this rea-
son, decisions may have large, unanticipated, and unintended effects. For example, a
single sentence in an early case may take on increasing significance over time.").
146 See generally Martin Shapiro, Toward a Theory of Stare Decisis, I J. LEGAL STUD.
125, 126 (1972). Shapiro's work deserves far more attention than it has received.
Shapiro differentiates between syntactic and cybernetic feedback as follows:
It is important to distinguish syntactic from cybernetic feedback. The former
involves transmission back concerning error in the sense of incorrect trans-
mission or receipt of information between sender and receiver within the sys-
tem; the latter involves transmission concerning error in the sense of incorrect
adjustment by the system to the outside world. Thus high levels of syntactic
feedback indicate trouble in the transmission facilities of the system, rather
than the sensitivity and learning that are typically imputed where high levels
of cybernetic feedback are present.
Id.
147 On accumulating precedent, see generally Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B.
Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin's Chain Novel Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156 (2005).
148 See Shapiro, supra note 146, at 133-34. Shapiro explains:
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reconstrue what it should have explicitly rescinded and replaced. This
practice has proven to be a disaster for fair use doctrine.
A. Factor One: Purpose and Character of the Use
Factor one calls upon courts to consider "the purpose and charac-
ter of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature
or is for nonprofit educational purposes." 49 We saw previously that
outcomes under this factor correlated very strongly with the outcome
of the overall fair use test. Indeed, 95.3% of the 148 opinions that
found that factor one disfavored fair use eventually found no fair use,
while 90.2% of the opinions that found that the factor favored fair use
eventually found fair use. Only factor four can boast of higher per-
centages. To determine what motivated courts to declare that factor
one favored or disfavored fair use, we need to look beneath the statu-
tory language, which appears to have had only limited influence on
the actual application of the factor, and evaluate how judges consid-
ered factor one's various subfactors. These subfactors are the com-
mercial or noncommercial character of the defendant's use, the de-
gree to which the defendant's use is transformative of the plaintiffs
work or otherwise "productive," the propriety or good faith of the de-
fendant's conduct, and whether the purpose of the defendant's use
falls within one of the categories of purposes mentioned in the pre-
amble of section 107. I review here each of these in turn.
1. The Commerciality Inquiry
While the concept of transformativeness has received far more at-
tention in the scholarly commentary,'50 I begin with commerciality be-
Following the rules of stare decisis, requests for legal changes, which are actu-
ally inspired by the failure of law to adjust correctly to the environment, and
are thus cybernetic feedback, are put in the form of syntactic feedback, state-
ments that some judge or lawyer has not correctly received the real message
that was transmitted by the previous cases (their "true principles"). In this way
much cybernetic feedback information can be squeezed into a communica-
tions system that demands very high levels of redundancy, and it can be
squeezed in without interfering with that sense of mutual support necessary to
the coordination of nonhierarchical organizations.
Id.
M 149 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
150 See, e.g., Kudon, supra note 119; Laura G. Lape, Transforming Fair Use: The Pro-
ductive Use Factor in Fair Use Doctrine, 58 ALB. L. REv. 677 (1995); Diane Leenheer Zim-
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cause it has received far more attention in the case law, particularly
among the lower courts. Of the 306 opinions, 84.0% explicitly con-
sidered whether the use was commercial or noncommercial in nature
under factor one, while only 38.2% explicitly considered the trans-
formativeness of the defendant's use under the factor. Furthermore,
as Figure 7 shows, courts' greater attention to commerciality was con-
sistent across time. This is regrettable. It is also inconsistent with the
actual statutory language of section 107 and the expectations of its
drafters. Indeed, many commentators and some courts, including the
Supreme Court in Campbell, have been highly critical, even dismissive,
of the commerciality inquiry, primarily on the ground that nearly all
expression in our culture is produced for profit or is otherwise in-
come-producing in some sense.' In his opinion for the majority in
Campbell, Justice Souter was moved to quote Samuel Johnson, that
"' [n]o man but a blockhead ever wrote, except for money." 152 Yet the
commerciality inquiry survives, as the data clearly show.
The perdurability of the commerciality inquiry appears largely to
be the result of a series of mistakes by the Supreme Court that began
with its 1984 Sony opinion, mistakes from which fair use doctrine, at
least as it is promulgated in our fair use cases, has yet to fully recover.
In Sony, the Court held, inter alia, that the unauthorized home use of
a Betamax video tape recorder to "time-shift""153 the performance of a
television program was a fair use. Writing for the majority, Justice Ste-
vens set forth in his discussions of the first and fourth fair use factors
what came to be called the "Sony presumption." 154 His formulation of
this presumption has caused so much trouble in our fair use case law
that it deserves to be quoted at length. In discussing the first factor,
Justice Stevens explained:
Although not conclusive, the first factor requires that "the commercial
or nonprofit character of an activity" be weighed in any fair use decision.
If the Betamax were used to make copies for a commercial or profit-
merman, The More Things Change, the Less They Seem "Transformed": Some Reflections on
Fair Use, 46J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 251 (1998).
151 See Zimmerman, supra note 150, at 252-55.
152 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994) (alteration in
original) (quoting 3 BOSwELL's LIFE OFJOHNSON 22 (George Birkbeck Hill ed. 1934)).
151 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 423 (1984)
(defining "time-shifting" as "the practice of recording a program to view it once at a
later time, and thereafter erasing it").
See, e.g., James Boyle, Intellectual Property Policy Online: A Young Person's Guide, 10
HAR.J.L. & TECH. 47, 99 (1996); Stacey L. Dogan, Comment, Sony, Fair Use, and File
Sharing, 55 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 971, 973 (2005).
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making purpose, such use would presumptively be unfair. The contrary
presumption is appropriate here, however, because the District Court's
findings plainly establish that time-shifting for private home use must be
characterized as a noncommercial, nonprofit activity.155
Justice Stevens returned to this presumption in discussing, under
factor four, the effect of home video recording on the value of and
market for copyrighted television programs:
Thus, although every commercial use of copyrighted material is pre-
sumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs
to the owner of the copyright, noncommercial uses are a different mat-
ter. A challenge to a noncommercial use of a copyrighted work requires
proof either that the particular use is harmful, or that if it should be-
come widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for the
copyrighted work. Actual present harm need not be shown; such a re-
quirement would leave the copyright holder with no defense against
predictable damage. Nor is it necessary to show with certainty that fu-
ture harm will result. What is necessary is a showing by a preponderance
of the evidence that some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists. If
the intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood may be pre-
sumed. But if it is for a noncommercial purpose, the likelihood must be
demonstrated. 156
Taken together, these two passages constituted a quite stunning
interpretation of section 107, especially since the first factor referred
to the "commercial nature" of the defendant's use as only one consid-
eration among others that the factor encompassed, and even more so
since the dependent clause in which the reference appeared was in-
serted very much at the eleventh hour of the drafting process, primar-
ily to address the concerns of those who were engaged in "nonprofit
educational purposes."15 7 The fourth factor, meanwhile, made no ex-
plicit reference to the commerciality of the defendant's use. Never-
theless, as handed down, Sony stood for the propositions that, under
factor one, a commercial "purpose" is presumptively unfair and a
noncommercial purpose presumptively fair, and that, under factor
four, a commercial use may be presumed to harm the market for the
plaintiff's work.
The next year, in Harper & Row, the Court only made matters
worse. Clearly sensing that it had overreached, the Court sought, in
its factor one analysis, to bend what it had said in Sony. Writing for
155 Sony, 464 U.S. at 448-49 (footnote omitted).
156 Id. at 451.
157 See PATRY, supra note 29, at 351-53.
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the majority, Justice O'Connor stated, "The fact that a publication was
commercial as opposed to nonprofit is a separate factor that tends to
weigh against a finding of fair use."''15  So far, so good. But then she
quoted the very dictum from Sony that she was seeking to overwrite-
"every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an un-
fair exploitation of the monopoly privilege"' 59-as if a tendency to dis-
favor fair use and a presumption against fair use were the same. In an
effort to maintain the appearance of "redundancy,"' the Court re-
sorted to "syntactic feedback" where "cybernetic feedback" was in or-
der. 16 Then, in its 1990 Stewart opinion, the Court again quoted in its
factor one analysis the same phrase from Sony that Harper & Row had,
but this time without the Harper & Row modification. 162 Neither Harper
& Row nor Stewart addressed commerciality under factor four.'6 3 Fi-
nally, in 1994, the Campbell Court made it clear that the Sony presump-
tion was no longer good law. It did so, however, syntactically, through
reconstrual: "[A] s we explained in Harper & Row, Sony stands for the
proposition that the 'fact that a publication was commercial as op-
posed to nonprofit is a separate factor that tends to weigh against a
finding of fair use." 1
64
And so, through Sony, the Harper & Row gloss on Sony, Stewart's re-
vival of Sony, and then Campbell's revival of the Harper & Row gloss, we
see not so much a refinement of precedent as an accumulation of
precedent. The sheer mass of this precedent, perhaps even regardless
of what it said, appears to have kept the commerciality inquiry in the
foreground of the factor one fair use analysis, far from where the
drafters of section 107 originally intended that it should be. Figure 7
suggests that courts' attention to the commerciality inquiry under fac-
158 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).
159 Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 451).
160 See Shapiro, supra note 146, at 127 (" [L] egal discourse organized by the rules of
stare decisis emphasizes, and itself insists that its success rests upon, high levels of re-
dundancy....").
161 Cf id. at 133 ("If the system employs high levels of syntactic redundancy, it does
not have the 'space' to transmit much cybernetic feedback information to its receiving
parts.").
162 Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990).
163 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566-69 (applying factor four, effect on the mar-
ket, without mentioning commerciality); Stewart, 495 U.S. at 238 (upholding the circuit
court's conclusion that release of a film would affect the market for a short story with-
out discussion of commerciality).
164 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 (1994) (quoting Harper
& Row, 471 U.S. at 562).
FAIR USE OPINIONS, 1978-2005
tor one peaked soon after Sony and Harper & Row and then declined
until Stewart, which appears to have revived it. The proportion of
courts conducting the commerciality inquiry declined somewhat after
Campbell but then returned more or less to its pre-Campbell level.
What about courts' treatment under factor one of the Sony pre-
sumption in particular? Figure 7 suggests that the proportion of opin-
ions citing the Sony presumption in their factor one analysis peaked
soon after Sony and Harper & Row, and then declined to a level that
held until Campbell, the Court opinion which explicitly, albeit syntacti-
cally, repudiated the presumption and should have buried it once and
for all. Writing soon after the Supreme Court handed down Campbell,
Judge Leval spoke of it as 'Justice Souter's [r]escue of [f]air [u]se." 165
Before Campbell, Judge Leval explained, courts would invoke the Sony
presumption if they otherwise thought that the commercial use at is-
sue was unfair, but if they wanted instead to find fair use, they "would
simply omit any mention of the 'commercial' thing."' 6  Now, Campbell
"has dispelled all those unhelpful slogans from the fair use discus-
sions-particularly the pernicious 'commercial use' presumption." 
6 7
The data do not bear this out. On the contrary, they suggest that
Judge Leval may have been overly pessimistic with respect to how
judges used the Sony presumption before Campbell, but overly optimis-
tic with respect to how they would use it after Campbell. Of the 108
opinions produced between Sony and Campbell, 45 (41.7% of 108)
cited the Sony presumption in their factor one analysis. Of these, 29
found the defendant's use to be commercial and 14 found fair use, for
a fair use win rate in these opinions of 0.311. Of the 61 opinions dur-
ing that period that did not cite the Sony presumption, 29 found fair
use, for a fair use win rate of 0.475. Though statistically significant,
the difference in win rates between the two sets of opinions does not,
of course, support the proposition that courts invoked the Sony pre-
sumption only when finding for the plaintiff. For the 162 opinions
produced after Campbell, however, the story is somewhat different, and
contrary to Judge Leval's hopes. As Figure 7 shows, Campbell triggered
a decline in the proportion per year of opinions citing the Sony pre-
sumption in their factor one analysis, but this decline was then fol-
lowed by a renewal of interest in the presumption among some lower
165 Pierre N. Leval, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose: Justice Souter's Rescue of Fair Use, 13
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 19,19 (1994).
16 Id. at 20-21.
167 Id. at 22.
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courts. Specifically, 12 of the 162 opinions produced after Campbell
invoked the Sony presumption under factor one-and 11 of these 12
found that the defendant's use was commercial, that factor one fa-
vored the plaintiff, and ultimately that there was no fair use. ' This is
good evidence of certain courts' willful-or, at best, unknowing-use
of the Sony presumption notwithstanding Campbell. ,69
Overall, despite the language of section 107, the commerciality
inquiry and the Sony presumption in particular remain exceptionally
tenacious memes in the fair use case law.' 70 No doubt this reflects in
part their high fitness for a litigation environment pervaded with
commercial expression. But it is also a consequence of the Supreme
Court's repeated attempts to maintain appearances by reconstruing
what it should simply have rescinded and replaced. Even so, there is a
strange final irony to all of this attention to the commerciality of the
defendant's use. The regression results presented in Table 9 suggest
that notwithstanding the Sony presumption, and notwithstanding
Campbells revival of the Harper & Row gloss that a "commercial as op-
posed to [a] nonprofit [use] is a separate factor that tends to weigh
against a finding of fair use," 171 a finding that the defendant's use was
for a commercial purpose (which was made in 64.4% of the opinions)
did not significantly influence the outcome of the fair use test in favor
of an overall finding of no fair use. Rather, it was a finding that the
defendant's use was for a noncommercial purpose (which was made in
15.4% of the opinions) that strongly influenced the outcome of the
test in favor of an overall finding of fair use. We are familiar with ver-
tical and horizontal precedent. But if there is such a thing as empiri-
cal or popular precedent, based on the empirical analysis of how the
population of judges who have previously employed a legal doctrine
did so, then this is one such precedent worth following. While the
fact that a defendant's use is for a commercial purpose should gener-
168 See, e.g., Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 886 F. Supp.
1120, 1130 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding that the reprinting of a competitor's newspaper
articles was not fair use). Of these 12 opinions, none found that the defendant's use
was transformative. Specifically, 6 explicitly found that the defendant's use was not
transformative and 6 did not address the issue of transformativeness.
169 Thirty-five of the 162 post-Campbell opinions sampled explicitly recognized un-
der factor one that Campbell had abrogated the commercial use presumption under
that factor.
170 On the tenacity of memes, see J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFIWARE: A THEORY
OF IDEOLOGY 74-90 (1998).
171 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 (1994) (quoting Harper
& Row, Publishers, Inc., v. Nation Enters., 417 U.S. 539, 562 (1985)).
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ally play no significant role in a fair use determination, the fact that a
defendant's use is for a noncommercial purpose should be under-
stood, as it appears it already is in practice, strongly to support a find-
ing of fair use.
Figure 7: Twenty-Opinion Moving Average of the
Proportion of Opinions Making the Commerciality and
Transformativeness Inquiries and Citing the
Sony Commercial Use Presumption
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2. The Transformativeness Inquiry
In his 1990 Harvard Law Review article, Toward a Fair Use Stan-
dard,172 Judge Leval encouraged courts to attend more closely in their
fair use analyses to the degree to which a defendant's use was "trans-
formative." Judge Leval argued that in weighing "the strength of the
secondary user's justification against factors favoring the copyright
owner," 73 the court should consider if "the secondary use adds value
to the original-if the quoted matter is used as raw material, trans-
formed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new in-
sights and understandings,"' 174 because "this is the very type of activity
172 Leval, supra note 93, at 1111.
I73 d.
174 Id.
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that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of so-. 175
ciety. Four years later, the Campbell court relied heavily on the con-
cept of transformativeness and on Judge Leval's exposition of it in its
factor one analysis of 2 Live Crew's parody. 176 Courts and commenta-
tors have since spoken of the concept of transformativeness as the cy-
nosure of fair use analysis: we are told that it is "vitally important to
the fair use inquiry ; it goes to the "heart of the fair use inquiry."
17
8
As one court has put it, " [a] lthough 'transformativeness' is primarily
analyzed in connection with the first fair use factor, it forms the basis
of the entire fair use analysis." 7 9 Indeed, some have suggested that
the transformativeness inquiry has essentially superseded section 107
as the backbone of our fair use doctrine. 180
It appears, however, that courts and commentators have exagger-
ated the influence of transformativeness doctrine on our fair use case
law. At the district court level, 41.2% of the 119 district court opin-
ions following Campbell failed even to refer to the doctrine, while
90.2% of the 92 opinions preceding Campbell failed to reference it (ei-
ther under the rubric of transformativeness or, as it was sometimes
175 Id.
176 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-79 (citing Leval, supra note 93, at 1111) (asserting that
the goal of copyright is "furthered by the creation of transformative works").
177 Leval, supra note 93, at 1111.
78 On Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 174 (2d Cir. 2001) (Leval, J.) (citing Camp-
bell, 510 U.S. at 579).
179 Hofheinz v. Discovery Commc'ns, Inc., No. 00-3802, 2001 WL 1111970, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2001) (citing On Davis, 246 F.3d at 174-76).
180 Compare this proposition with NIMMER, supra note 139, at § 13.05[A][1]
(footnote omitted), highlighting the importance of transformativeness:
Those Second Circuit cases appear to label a use 'not transformative' as a
shorthand for 'not fair,' and correlatively 'transformative' for 'fair.' Such a
strategy empties the term of meaning-for the 'transformative' moniker to
guide, rather than follow, the fair use analysis, it must amount to more than a
conclusory label.
Also compare to Sag, supra note 9, at 388 (footnote omitted), noting the importance of
transformativeness:
The dominance of the transformativeness test makes the actual statutory lan-
guage regarding noncommercial and educational uses largely irrelevant.
Also, 'transformativeness' is clearly a meta-factor: the extent to which a use
transforms the work cannot be determined without reference to the other fac-
tors, such as the nature of the original work, the quantitative and qualitative
similarity between the works and the effect of the use on the value of the
original work.
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called, "productive use" l""). At the circuit court level, the percentages
are better, but still far from what we would expect for a doctrine now
said to be the basis of the fair use inquiry. Of the 43 circuit court
opinions that followed Campbell, 18.6% failed to invoke the concept,
while 84.4% of the 45 circuit court opinions that preceded Campbell
failed to invoke it. Furthermore, the doctrine appears to be losing
strength. Figure 7 shows the proportion of opinions over time that
made some reference to transformativeness. The doctrine's citation
curve began its downward slope sometime in the early part of this
decade.
Nevertheless, in those opinions in which transformativeness did
play a role, it exerted nearly dispositive force not simply on the out-
come of factor one but on the overall outcome of the fair use test.
More specifically, the data suggest that while a finding of transforma-
tiveness is not necessary to trigger an overall finding of fair use, it is suf-
ficient to do so. We can infer that it is not necessary in light of the fact
that 25 (or 36.8%) of the 68 post-Campbell opinions that found fair use
made no reference to transformativeness and 4 explicitly found that the
defendant's use was not transformative. We can infer that it is sufficient
(or nearly sufficient) in light of the fact that each of the 13 circuit court
opinions and 27 of the 29 district court opinions that found the defen-
dant's use to be transformative also found it to be a fair use-and one
of the two district court outliers was reversed on appeal. is2 Further-
more, as several courts explicitly noted, i1 3 a finding of transformative-
1s1 See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 970
(9th Cir. 1981) ("As the first sentence of § 107 indicates, fair use has traditionally in-
volved what might be termed the 'productive use' of copyrighted material."), rev'd, 464
U.S. 417 (1984).
182 See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1378-85 (N.D.
Ga. 2001) (finding no fair use and granting preliminary injunction where a parody's
commerciality and other characteristics outweighed its transformativeness), vacated, 252
F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) and 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). The one
unreversed outlier was Castle Rock Entertainment v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., 955 F. Supp.
260 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), affd, 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998). For further discussion of these
cases, see Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 347,
363-64 & nn.54-55 (2005) (discussing SunTrust Bank and Castle Rock).
183 See, e.g., Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 948 F. Supp. 1214, 1223
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("I find that the purposes of copyright are best served by a finding that
the highly transformative character of the Nielsen ad trumps its admittedly commercial
purpose and that the first fair use factor therefore weighs in favor of the defendant,
albeit perhaps by only a slight margin."); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F.
Supp. 1, 12-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("Thus courts have repeatedly found in favor of trans-
formative secondary uses on the first factor, notwithstanding the presence of profit
motivation. Thus, although courts ritualistically proclaim, almost as a mantra, that
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ness trumped a finding that the defendant's use was commercial for
purposes of determining whether factor one favored fair use. In 28
opinions, the court found the defendant's use to be both commercial
and transformative under factor one, and in 26 of these opinions, the
court found both that factor one and the overall test favored fair use-
with one of the two outliers reversed on appeal. 1
8 4
These data may go far toward explaining why Table 9 reports such
a high coefficient and odds ratio for a finding of transformativeness.
Putting the Table's regression results in more easily understood terms,
consider that, based on the regression model used to produce the Ta-
ble, a defendant has a 35.5% chance of winning the fair use defense
where it has made a nontransformative, commercial use of a creative,
published work (with all other variables set at zero). If that same use
were found to be transformative, the defendant's chance of winning
the fair use defense would increase to 94.9%.
Interestingly, while a finding of transformativeness may be disposi-
tive of the outcome of the fair use test, such a finding does not stam-
pede the outcomes of the other factors. Of the 43 opinions that found
the defendant's use to be transformative, only 6 found that all four fac-
tors favored a finding of fair use. Instead, 26 of these 43 opinions
found that factor two, going to the nature of the plaintiffs work, disfa-
vored fair use, and 6 of these 26 further found that factor three, going
to the amount and substantiality of the defendant's taking, also disfa-
vored a finding of fair use. This makes sense. Defendants are far more
likely to make a transformative use of a creative rather than a factual
work, and their transformative use is likely to involve a substantial tak-
ing of plaintiffs' expression. To their credit, in opinions addressing a
transformative use, courts were generally willing to call factors two and
three as they saw them rather than bend those factor outcomes to con-
form to the overall test outcome. There were exceptions, however.
Among those opinions that found that a defendant's use was transfor-
mative, but that factors two or three nevertheless favored fair use, there
appear several fine examples ofjudicial slight of hand. 8 5
every commercial use is 'presumptively' unfair, that presumption is easily overcome by
a transformative, nonsuperseding use." (citations omitted)), order amended and super-
seded, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
184 See supra note 182.
185 See, e.g., Nfifiez v. Caribbean Int'l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2000)
(stating, in a discussion of the third factor, that "[i]n this case, El Vocero admittedly
copied the entire picture; however, to copy any less than that would have made the pic-
ture useless to the story," and that "[a]s a result, like the district court, we count this
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3. The Bad Faith Inquiry
Must a defendant's use be "fair" in order to qualify as a "fair use"?
Should the "propriety" of the defendant's conduct play any role in the
court's fair use analysis? Lloyd Weinreb thought so, and urged courts
to consider the "fairness" of the defendant's use as an additional over-
arching factor.18 6 Other commentators have questioned the feasibility
of the fairness inquiry on the ground that fairness is too subjective-
or circular-a standard.187 Still others argue that the fairness inquiry
unnecessarily complicates the fundamental utilitarian question, which
looks at what outcome will ultimately promote the progress of human
creativity and should inform any fair use determination.'88
The data suggest that considerations of fairness, propriety, and
good or bad faith have not played a significant role in our fair use case
factor as of little consequence to our analysis"); Blanch v. Koons, 396 F. Supp. 2d 476,
481-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("The photograph as a whole is sufficiently creative and origi-
nal to receive copyright protection, and it is copyrighted. Yet its general publication
throughout the United States favors fair use .... Blanch has no right to the appear-
ance of the Gucci sandals (perhaps the most striking element of the photograph), and
Koons appropriated nothing else of the photograph except the crossed legs. Viewed
alone (disregarding the sandals) they are banal rather than creative. The second fac-
tor favors the defendants." (citations omitted)); Newport-Mesa Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Cal. Dep't of Educ., 371 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1177-78 (C.D. Cal. 2005) ("Under the sec-
ond fair use factor, the nature of the copyrighted work is creative rather than informa-
tional. '[D] evelopment of the test questions as well as their compilation in a particular
test form is a creative, imaginative, and original process.' This ordinarily would weigh
against finding fair use. But, with the addition of a student's answers, the questions
and answers are informational in nature, which weighs in favor of fair use." (quoting
Coll. Entrance Examination Bd. v. Pataki, 889 F. Supp. 554, 569 (N.D.N.Y. 1995)) (al-
teration in original) (citations marks omitted)); Penelope v. Brown, 792 F. Supp. 132,
138 n.7 (D. Mass. 1992) (stating under the second factor that "Penelope's work is
scholarly and hence ... the law should favor its dissemination").
186 SeeWeinreb, supra note 19, at 1138 ("[F]air use has historically been and ought
to remain what its name suggests: an exemption from copyright infringement for uses
that are fair."); id. at 1141 ("Although the courts were presumably construing the stat-
ute according to the legislative intent, it has from the beginning had the flavor of an
equitable doctrine, importing, as its name indicates, considerations of fairness not di-
rectly related to the statutory purpose.").
187 See, e.g., BRUCE P. KELLER & JEFFREY P. CUNARD, COPYRIGHT LAW § 8:1 (2003)
("The central concept underlying the doctrine-an assessment of the 'fairness' of the
use in question, based on a balancing of several factors-is inherently subjective. As a
result, what one judge in his or her personal view regards as a 'fair use' may sharply
contrast with what another judge down the hall may think.").
188 See, e.g., Leval, supra note 93, at 1126 (arguing that "[n]ojustification exists for
adding a morality test" to the fair use inquiry); Madison, supra note 7, at 1555-56 (urg-
ing courts to consider not the legitimacy of the defendant's use, but rather its effect on
social welfare);.
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law-notwithstanding the frequency with which opinions intoned that
fair use is an "equitable doctrine."89 However, in the few cases where
courts explicitly found that the defendant's conduct was undertaken
in bad faith, courts almost invariably found no fair use. Forty-nine (or
16.0%) of the 306 opinions made some reference to the propriety of
the defendant's conduct or to the relevance of the fairness analysis,
with 25 of them doing so under factor one.190  Fourteen opinions
found improper conduct, 12 of which found no fair use and 7 of
which found that all four factors favored that overall outcome. Con-
versely, of the 28 opinions in which the court found the defendant's
conduct not to be improper, 24 found fair use. Unlike opinions that
found bad faith, opinions that found good faith did not tend to stam-
pede the factors.' 9'
Though the data strongly suggest that a finding of bad faith will
trigger a finding of no fair use, they should be interpreted with caution.
More so than any other subfactor consideration, the fairness determina-
tion appears to be susceptible to a basic circularity: did the court find
the defendant's use to be unfair because the defendant's conduct was
improper, or did the court find the defendant's conduct to be im-
proper because its use was unfair? The opinions that made a fairness
determination tended to do so on highly fact-specific grounds, so no
strong generalizations can be made to help answer this question. Still,
there was only one opinion in which the court explicitly found that but
for the defendant's bad faith, the court would have found fair use.192
189 By this, courts typically meant simply that the fair use doctrine is "an equitable
rule of reason, which permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute
when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to fos-
ter." Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 448 (1984) and Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621
F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980)); see also Shubha Ghosh, Deprivatizing Copyright, 54 CASE W.
REs. L. REv. 387, 485 (2003) ("Even though fair use is a rule of law rather than an eq-
uitable rule, equitable principles often inform the manner in which the doctrine is ap-
plied.").
190 One opinion considered the defendant's bad faith under both the first factor
and as an additional factor. See Haberman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 201,
211 (D. Mass. 1986) (stating that the propriety of the defendant's conduct is relevant
to the "character" of the use under factor one); id. at 214 (reconsidering equitable
conduct as an additional factor).
191 The mean stampede score in the 14 opinions that found bad faith was -2.43
(standard deviation = 2.06), while the mean stampede score in the 28 opinions that
found no bad faith was 1.82 (standard deviation = 2.31).
192 See Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Med. & Scientific Commc'ns, Inc., No. 87-0167, 1992
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9502, at *57 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 1992) ("In this case, defendants' lack
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Otherwise, the fairness consideration appeared rarely to be decisive.
19
3
This is consistent with the regression results reported in Table 9, in
which the bad faith variable failed to produce a significant coefficient.
More commonly, a fairness finding appeared to function as merely an
additional consideration in support of an outcome already deter-
mined-or overdetermined-by other considerations.
4. The Preambular Purposes Inquiry
Section 107 volunteers in its preamble certain examples of fair
purposes. Specifically, it provides that the defendant's use of the
plaintiff's expression might be deemed fair if it is made "for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including mul-
tiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research."''9 4 Table 10
sets out the number and proportion of opinions that found the de-
fendant's use to fall within one of these categories. While defendants
generally enjoyed very high fair use win rates in these opinions, de-
fendants engaged in "educational" purposes did not. There is noth-
ing remarkable about the 27 educational purpose opinions that can
explain this surprising result. 19 5 In any event, the regression model
suggests that when controlling for the effects of other findings, a find-
ing that the defendant's use fell within one of the preambular catego-
ries did not significantly affect the outcome of the fair use test. In-
stead, as with a finding of bad faith, other considerations appear to
have determined the outcome otherwise endorsed by the preambular
purposes inquiry.
of good faith in utilizing the routines tips the balance of the factors against a finding of
fair use. Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to recover on its claim of copyright infringe-
ment with respect to defendants' literal copying of plaintiff's image retrieval routines
in the programs Hairy Cell Roche and Low Back Pain."). In this case, Soflel yielded a
stampede score of 0.
See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309 (2d Cir. 1992) (considering the de-
fendant's bad faith conduct in relation to the purpose and character of the use); New
Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertlesman Music Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 1517, 1530 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) ("The Court's conclusion is also bolstered by examining the propriety of
Zomba's conduct in this case."); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chew-
ing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1036 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (finding the defendant's in-
tention to trade on the plaintiffs good will to be an element of bad faith, which weighs
against fair use).
194 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). See generally Madison, supra note 7, at
1552-57 (discussing the relevance of the listing of fair uses in the preamble of section
107).
15 Only 4 of these opinions involved standardized testing.
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Table 10: Distribution and Fair Use
Win Rates of Opinions Explicitly
Addressing Preambular Purposes
("Found FU" denotes the proportion of opinions that found fair use.)
Preambular Purpose n % of 306 Found FU
Research purpose 22 7.2 .409
Critical purpose 29 9.5 .621
News reporting 27 8.8 .778
Educational purpose 27 8.8 .482
B. Factor Two: Nature of the Copyrighted Work
Factor two instructs courts to consider "the. nature of the copy-
righted work."1 96 The data with respect to factor two are seemingly as
ambiguous and open to interpretation as the statutory language itself.
Despite section 107's command that "the factors to be considered
shall include"'19 7 factor two, 17.7% of the 306 opinions failed even to
refer to the factor, while an additional 6.5% did so only to call it ir-
relevant. We saw above that the correlation coefficients in Table 5
and the regression coefficients in Table 6 suggest that the outcome of
factor two typically has no significant effect on the overall outcome of
the fair use test. Many courts and commentators have long asserted as
much. Yet the regression coefficients reported in Table 9 for certain
subfactor considerations under factor two suggest that we cannot write
off the factor entirely. On the contrary, certain findings under factor
two appear significantly to affect the outcome of the fair use test,
sometimes in ways that run contrary-or obliquely-to the original in-
tent of the doctrine underlying those findings.
From the rather open-ended statutory language of the second fac-
tor have emerged two subfactor considerations: whether the plain-
tiffs work is creative or factual in nature and whether it is published
or unpublished. I consider each of these in turn.
196 17 U.S.C. § 107.
197 Id.
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1. The Creative/Factual Work Inquiry
As the Campbell Court explained, factor two "calls for recognition
that some works are closer to the core of intended copyright protec-
tion than others, with the consequence that fair use is more difficult
to establish when the former works are copied."'9 s According to this
framework, creative works "of fiction or fantasy"'I stand at the core of
copyright protection, making a finding of their fair use less likely,
while factual works stand at the periphery, making a finding of their
fair use more likely.
Though courts and commentators have belittled the significance
of the creative/factual work inquiry along with the rest of factor two,
the data suggest that in the opinions studied, there is in fact a signifi-
cant inverse relation between the creativity of the plaintiff's work and
the likelihood of its fair use. Of the 306 opinions, 41.1% explicitly
found that the plaintiffs work was creative rather than factual in na-
ture, and 34.1% of these opinions found fair use. Meanwhile, 16.3%
of the opinions explicitly found that the plaintiffs work was factual
rather than creative in nature, and 54.0% of these opinions found fair
use. Though it is probably impossible to establish any degree of cau-
sality, it is also interesting to note that opinions in which a court ex-
plicitly found the plaintiffs work to be creative or factual also exhib-
ited a good deal of stampeding. Among the 126 opinions that found
the plaintiff's work to be creative in nature, a strong plurality of 43.4%
found all four factors to disfavor fair use, while among the 50 opinions
that found the plaintiff's work to be factual in nature, a plurality of
20028.0% found all four factors to favor fair use.
It should not be surprising, then, that the regression model re-
ported in Table 9 predicts that a defendant has a 35.5% chance of
prevailing in its fair use defense when it has made commercial use of a
published work that is found to be creative in nature (with all other
variables set at zero), and an 80.3% chance of prevailing in its fair use
defense when it has made commercial use of a published work that is
198 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).
00 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985)
("The law generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate factual works than works
of fiction or fantasy.").
200 An additional 26.0% of these 50 opinions yielded a stampede score of-2, mean-
ing that three factors disfavored and one factor favored fair use. All of these opinions
found no fair use, and all but one found that the sole factor not supporting that out-
come was factor two.
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found instead to be factual in nature (again, with all other variables
set at zero). This is a substantial difference in the probability of suc-
cess, one which suggests that notwithstanding the correlation and re-
gression coefficients reported in Tables 5 and 6, the creative or factual
nature of the plaintiff's work does in fact play a role in judges' deter-
minations of the fair use issue.
As a normative matter, this is again an empirical precedent alto-
gether worth following. In principle, the four factors of section 107
seek to "balanc[e] the need to provide individuals with sufficient in-
centives to create public works with the public's interest in the dis-
semination of information." 20 ' As such, the section 107 test should do
more than simply evaluate, under factor four, the extent to which the
defendant's use impacts the "potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.",02 That inquiry addresses only one side of the bal-
ance. The first and second factors of section 107 exist to remind
courts to consider the other side of the balance, going to the "public's
interest in the dissemination of information., 20 3 Happily, it appears-
at least with regard to the creative/factual inquiry-that many courts
are doing just that.
2. The Published/Unpublished Work Inquiry
The story of the published-versus-unpublished-work inquiry under
factor two is a story of nonergodicity, unintended consequences, and
accumulating precedent. In her 1984 Harper & Row opinion for the
majority, Justice O'Connor stated that "It]he fact that a work is un-
published is a critical element of its 'nature"' and that "the scope of
fair use is narrower with respect to unpublished works."20 4 She also
wrote that "[u] nder ordinary circumstances, the author's right to con-
trol the first public appearance of his undisseminated expression will
outweigh a claim of fair use."0 5 Writing in dissent, Justice Brennan
declared that this latter statement "introduces into analysis of this case
a categorical presumption against prepublication fair use." 20 6 Three
21 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir.
1986).
2 17 U.S.C. § 107.
203 See generally Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 257, 286-90 (2007) (discussing the importance of positive externalities, or "spill-
overs," to a proper understanding of the fair use defense).
204 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985).
205 Id. at 555.
206 Id. at 595 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
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years later, in Salinger v. Random House, the Second Circuit adopted
the Harper & Row dissent's aggressive interpretation of the majority
opinion: "[W]e think that the tenor of the Court's entire discussion
of unpublished works conveys the idea that such works normally enjoy
complete protection against copying any protected expression." °7 A
variety of opinions from the Second Circuit and elsewhere subse-
208
quently advanced this reading, so that by 1991, the Second Circuit
would declare in Wright v. Warner Books, Inc. that "[u]npublished
works are the favorite sons of factor two" and that "[o]ur prece-
dents... leave little room for discussion of this factor once it has been
determined that the copyrighted work is unpublished., 2 0 It seemed
at the time that the courts had built a new Sony-like presumption, this
210
time against uses of unpublished works. In 1992, Congress inter-
vened. It amended section 107 to include at its conclusion, "The fact
that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if
such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.,
21
1
The strange result of this series of events, a result which the Harper
& Row court could hardly have foreseen, is that in the opinions stud-
ied, the fact that the plaintiffs work was unpublished appears to have
exerted no significant effect on the outcome of the fair use test, but
the fact that the plaintiff's work was published appears to have exerted
a strong effect on the outcome of the test in favor of a finding of fair212
use. Meanwhile, a wide array of precedents developed around the
published/unpublished work inquiry, so that courts could draw upon
previous case law to assert that the unpublished or published status of
207 811 F.2d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 1987).
208 See, e.g., New Era Publ'ns Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 873 F.2d 576, 583 (2d
Cir. 1989) ("Where use is made of materials of an 'unpublished nature,' the second
fair use factor has yet to be applied in favor of an infringer, and we do not do so
here."); Ass'n of Am. Med. Coils. v. Carey, 728 F. Supp. 873, 885 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) ("[A]
copyrighted work which is both published and factual in nature is more properly sub-
ject to a fair use than an unpublished work that is fictional in nature .... "), rev'd sub
nom. Ass'n of Am. Med. Coils. v. Cuomo, 928 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1991); Love v. Kwitny,
706 F. Supp. 1123, 1133-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding that the unpublished status of the
plaintiff's work weighs "heavily" in the plaintiff's favor despite the work's factual nature
and limited distribution).
209 953 F.2d 731, 737 (2d Cir. 1991).
210 See generally Crews, supra note 28, at 40-42 (analyzing the impact these cases had
on the Second Circuit's effectively establishing "a conclusive presumption" operating
against a claim of fair use for unpublished works).
211 Pub. L. No. 102492, 106 Stat. 3145 (1992) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§ 107 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).
212 See supra Table 9.
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the work either favored or disfavored a finding of fair use. Thirty-
seven opinions explicitly found that the plaintiff's work was unpub-
lished, with 29 of these asserting that this fact disfavored a finding of
fair use, 3 asserting that it favored a finding of fair use (because the
plaintiffs expression was not otherwise available to the public), 1 and
5 concluding that the unpublished status of the plaintiffs work was
unimportant to the fair use analysis. Courts found fair use in roughly
half (48.6%) of these opinions. By comparison, 42 opinions explicitly
found that the plaintiffs work was published, with 36 asserting that
this fact favored a finding of fair use, 4 asserting that it disfavored a
finding of fair use (because the plaintiffs work was otherwise available
to the purchasing public) ,24 and 2 asserting that it made no differ-
ence to the outcome of the fair use test. Courts found fair use in
77.8% of the 36 opinions that asserted that the published status of the
plaintiff's work favored a finding of fair use, and in 69.1% of the 42
opinions overall. As with the subfactor variables discussed above, the
inner workings of these data help to explain why the regression model
predicts (with commercial use set to one and all other variables set to
zero) that the defendant's chances of succeeding in its fair use de-
fense increase from 27.4% to 57.8% when the status of the plaintiffs
work shifts from not-published to published-and not at all when the
status of the plaintiffs work shifts from unpublished to not-
unpublished.
From the perspective of a fair use maximalist, the data once again
reveal an encouraging, and ironic, result. As above, the Supreme Court
sought to establish that a certain finding (here, that the work is unpub-
lished) disfavors fair use. Lower courts appear not to have acted on that
213 See, e.g., Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 631 F. Supp. 1432, 1437 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) ("The advancement of the social sciences and public discourse on an important
issue is enhanced by permitting liberal, but fair, use of such materials."); cf Penelope v.
Brown, 792 F. Supp. 132, 138 (D. Mass. 1992) ("Although Teaching About Doublespeak is
still in print and is sold in college bookstores, it cannot be said to be widely available to
the public. Lack of availability lends Brown greater justification for reproducing it.").
214 See, e.g., Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 558 F. Supp. 1247,
1251 (W.D.N.Y. 1983) ("[C]opies of plaintiffs' works may be obtained for short periods
through normal channels, and this factor does not shift any weight towards defen-
dants' fair use contentions."); Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F.
Supp. 1156, 1177 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) ("[A]I1 the plaintiffs testified that they were readily
able to supply and sell copies of their works .... In short, there are no factual charac-
teristics necessary to justify fair use based upon the unavailability of the specific copy-
righted works in this case.").
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dictum, however, other than to invert it to conclude that the opposite
215
of that finding (here, that the work is published) favors fair use.
C. Factor Three: Amount and Substantiality of the Use
The third factor instructs courts to consider "the amount and sub-
stantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole."216 In other words, and as the great majority of the opinions
recognized, this factor calls upon courts to evaluate-both on a quan-
titative and a qualitative scale-what proportion of the plaintiffs work
217the defendant used. We saw above that the outcome of factor three
correlated strongly with the outcome of the overall test as well as with
the outcomes of factors one and four. These correlations were espe-
cially strong when the third factor was found to favor fair use. This is
not surprising. An insubstantial taking of the plaintiffs work will not
likely have an appreciable effect on the market for or value of that
work and, perhaps on that ground alone, will likely trigger a finding
of fair use. Indeed, of the 79 opinions that found that factor three fa-
vored fair use, 76 subsequently found fair use, and 72 of these also
found that factor four favored that result.
Of all of the factors, the third factor boasts the most settled and
easily understood doctrine. In general, the more the defendant takes
of the plaintiffs work, the less likely it is that the taking will qualify as
a fair use. What if the defendant takes the entirety of the plaintiff's
work? Courts and commentators have asserted that, "generally, it may
not constitute a fair use if the entire work is reproduced,"21 8 though
215 As between the creative/factual work inquiry and the published/unpublished
work inquiry, which inquiry had the greater impact on the outcome of factor two? The
data are inconclusive. All of the 11 opinions that addressed the use of a creative, un-
published work found that factor two disfavored fair use, and 6 of the 7 opinions that
addressed the use of a factual, published work found that factor two favored fair use.
These results are not surprising. What happens, however, when the two subfactors un-
der the second factor point in opposite directions? Twenty-two opinions addressed the
use of a creative, published work, and 19 of these found that factor two disfavored fair
use, while 6 opinions addressed the use of a factual, unpublished work and 4 of these
found that factor two disfavored fair use. From this, we can tentatively conclude that a
work's creative status trumps its published status, but that a work's factual status does
not necessarily trump its unpublished status.
216 17 U.S.C. § 107.
217 Nevertheless, 10 opinions evaluated the extent of the taking as a proportion of
the defendant's work, and 2 evaluated the extent of the taking both as a proportion of
the plaintiff's work and as a proportion of the defendant's work.
218 Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting
NIMMER, supra note 139, § 13.05[A] [3]).
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"there may be certain very limited situations wherein copying of even
the entire work for a different functional purpose may be regarded as
a fair use., 2' 9 The data tell a slightly different story, one that suggests
that these situations are not so limited. Of the 99 opinions that ad-
dressed facts in which the defendant took the entirety of the plaintiff's
work, 27.3% found fair use (albeit with 9 of these 27 opinions finding
a transformative use, and 4 finding a nontransformative use). The
story is more extreme in situations where the court finds that the de-
fendant did or did not take the "essence" or the "heart" of the plain-
tiffs work. Courts explicitly found that the defendant took the heart
of the plaintiffs work in 37 opinions, and found no fair use in 35 of
these. Courts made the opposite finding-that the defendant did not
take the heart of the plaintiff's work-in 25 opinions, and found fair
use in 23 of these.
Given the apparent dominance of the first and fourth factors, it is
easy to underestimate the importance of the third-factor analysis to
the outcome of the fair use test. But if we accept, as I will argue in a
moment, that in nearly all situations, the fourth factor functions as a
kind of metafactor under which courts synthesize their analyses of the
first three factors, then we are in a position to appreciate how much of
an impact the third factor actually has on the outcome of the fair use
test-that is, on the outcome of the fourth factor. Here, the regres-
sion results reported in Table 9 are of special interest. They show that
the subfactor considerations going to the taking of the entirety of the
work, and in particular the heart of the work, exert a significant influ-
ence on the outcome of the test. Specifically, the regression analysis
predicts that if a defendant makes a commercial use of a creative, pub-
lished work, its chances of succeeding in its fair use defense decline
from 35.5% to 12.0% if it is found to take the entirety of that work,
and to 1.0% if it is found to take the heart of that work.
D. Factor Four: Effect on the Market
The fourth factor calls upon courts to consider "the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work."220 As mentioned above, the Harper & Row Court declared that
this factor was "undoubtedly the single most important element of fair
219 NIMMER, supra note 139, § 13.05[D] [I].
220 17 U.S.C. § 107.
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use,"22' and 59.0% of the opinions following Harper & Row (but pre-
ceding Campbell) explicitly cited this proposition. A decade later, the
Campbell Court attempted to bend the Harper & Row dictum. Again
choosing to reconstrue rather than rescind and replace, the Court
obliquely stated that, in determining the question of fair use, "[a~ll
[factors] are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light
of the purposes of copyright."2 2 This intervention had a modest ef-
fect on the lower courts, as Figure 8 shows. Of the opinions following
Campbell, 26.5% continued explicitly to state that factor four was the
most important factor.
Whether the Supreme Court in its dicta on the issue was trying to
describe the current state of the doctrine or prescribe what the doc-
trine should be is unclear. The conventional wisdom is that regardless
of what the Supreme Court has said, the fourth factor analysis remains
the most influential on the outcome of the overall test. The data sup-
port a different account, however, one which suggests that we have
failed to appreciate the true role of the fourth factor analysis in the
section 107 test as applied. The fourth factor essentially constitutes a
metafactor under which courts integrate their analyses of the other
three factors and, in doing so, arrive at the outcome not simply of the
fourth factor, but of the overall test. Consider that of the 141 opin-
ions that found that factor four disfavored fair use, 140 found no fair
use. The one outlying opinion that found fair use reasoned, quite ob-
tusely, that factor four "slightly disfavors a finding of fair use since
plaintiff's and defendant's books are both directed towards the same
audience." 223 Meanwhile, of the 116 opinions that found that factor
four favored fair use, all but 6 found fair use. Four of the outliers rea-
soned that because there was no market for the plaintiffs' works the
factor could not favor the plaintiff, 224 and the other 2 were Scientology
cases in which the court reasoned that the defendants' limited uses
221 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
222 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994).
22 Williamson v. Pearson Educ., No. 00-8420, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17062, at *19
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2001).
224 See Batesville Servs. v. Funeral Depot, Inc., No. 02-01011, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
24336, at *25 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 10, 2004); Lamb v. Starks, 949 F. Supp. 753, 757 (N.D.
Cal. 1996); Lish v. Harper's Magazine Found., 807 F. Supp. 1090, 1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1992);
Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Med. & Scientific Commc'ns, Inc., No. 87-0167, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9502, at *54 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 1992).
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did not substantially impact the religion's efforts to retain or gain
members. 22s
The synthetic and dispositive nature of the fourth factor analysis
may explain why no real subfactors have developed under factor
four-other than the three section 107 factors that precede it-and
why courts have very rarely made specific factual findings under the
factor. Instead, the vast majority of the opinions simply conducted
what amounted to little more than an unstructured and conclusory
226rule-of-reason analysis. To the extent that courts structured their
factor four analysis around anything, they structured it around various
relatively feeble propositions of law. One is the presumption estab-
lished by Sony that "[ilf the intended use is for commercial gain," then
a likelihood of market harm under factor four "may be presumed."227
The Campbell Court sought to overwrite this dictum on which the Sixth
Circuit majority opinion in Campbell had so heavily relied. The Camp-
bell Court first simply rejected the presumption outright as "a pre-
sumption which as applied here we hold to be error."228  Then the
Court formulated a highly sensible refinement of the original pre-
sumption:
No "presumption" or inference of market harm that might find support
in Sony is applicable to a case involving something beyond mere duplica-
tion for commercial purposes. Sony's discussion of a presumption con-
trasts a context of verbatim copying of the original in its entirety for
commercial purposes, with the noncommercial context of Sony itself
(home copying of television programming). In the former circum-
stances, what Sony said simply makes common sense: when a commercial
use amounts to mere duplication of the entirety of an original, it clearly
"supersede[s] the objects" of the original and serves as a market re-
placement for it, making it likely that cognizable market harm to the
original will occur. But when, on the contrary, the second use is trans-
formative, market substitution is at least less certain, and market harm
229may not be so readily inferred.
225 See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, No. 95-1107, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15454, at
*28-31 (E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 1996); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm'cn
Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1248-49 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
226 Cf Leval, supra note 93, at 1107 ("Decisions are not governed by consistent
principles, but seem rather to result from intuitive reactions to individual fact pat-
terns.").
227 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
228 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994).
229 Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.
Cas. 342, 348 (D. Mass. 1841)) (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 451). The Sony Court stated
that "[a] challenge to a noncommercial use of a copyrighted work requires proof ei-
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But as Figure 8 shows, in the years following Campbell, many lower
courts ignored or were ignorant of this refinement. m Of the 108 opin-
ions following Sony and preceding Campbell, 33 cited to Sony's marketS 231
harm presumption. Of the 162 opinions following Campbell, 25 con-
tinued to cite to the original presumption (with 76.0% of these ulti-
mately finding no fair use),232 while only 14 cited to the Campbell modi-
fication of it (with 57.1% of these ultimately finding no fair use).2 3
Sony established another proposition of law, essentially a slippery
slope principle, around which courts tended to structure their fourth
factor analysis.234 Campbell reinforced this proposition, stating that the
fourth factor "requires courts to consider not only the extent of mar-
ther that the particular use is harmful, or that if it should become widespread, it would
adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work." 464 U.S. at 451.
Though this dictum was directed toward noncommercial uses, courts, such as the
Campbell Court, applied it, a fortiori, to commercial uses.
230 Consider the remarkable post-Campbell Ninth Circuit opinion that cited to
Harper & Row for the proposition that the fourth factor is the most important and then
cited both to the Campbell modification and to the original Sony presumption:
The last, and "undoubtedly the single most important" of all the factors, is the
effect the use will have on the potential market for and value of the copy-
righted works. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566 .... The more transformative
the new work, the less likely the new work's use of copyrighted materials will
affect the market for the materials. See CBS Broad., 305 F.3d at 941. Finally, if
the purpose of the new work is commercial in nature, "the likelihood [of
market harm] may be presumed." A & M Records, 239 F.3d at 1016 (quoting
Sony, 464 U.S. at 451... ).
Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 630-31 (9th Cir. 2003) (al-
teration in original).
231 Only 2 of these opinions found that the defendant's use was transformative, and
both of these opinions found that factor four, as well as the overall test, favored fair use.
See Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1260 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding fair use
where the borrowing author "applied substantial intellectual labor to the verbatim quota-
tions"); Rubin v. Brooks/Cole Publ'g Co., 836 F. Supp. 909, 916 (D. Mass. 1993) (finding
fair use where the unauthorized reprinting of a psychological scale was "productive and
scholarly" and "encourage[d] the reader to question the validity of" the scale).
232 In 5 of these opinions, the court explicitly found that the defendant's use was
transformative. Nevertheless, the court's failure in each of these opinions to apply the
Campbell modification does not appear to have adversely affected the outcome of the
fair use test. In each of these 5 opinions, the court found that factor four and the
overall test favored a finding of fair use.
233 In 6 of these 14 opinions, the court found under factor one that the defen-
dant's use was transformative, and in all but one of these 6, the court found that factor
four and the overall test favored fair use. The one outlier was, as usual, SunT7ist Bank
v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2001), vacated, 252 F.3d 1165
( lIth Cir. 2001).
2 Sony, 464 U.S. at 451.
2008]
620 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 156:549
ket harm caused by the particular actions of the alleged infringer, but
also 'whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort en-
gaged in by the defendant.., would result in a substantially adverse
impact on the potential market' for the original." 23  Figure 8 shows
the impact on the fair use case law, first of Sony's, and then of Camp-
bell's endorsement of this principle. Like many other doctrinal state-
ments made by the Court, the slippery slope principle enjoyed an ini-
tial rapid rise in fashion after each of its Supreme Court
endorsements and then suffered just as rapid a fall, until it reached a
kind of equilibrium, so that it has recently been cited in about 35% of
lower courts' fair use opinions. The data suggest that there was no
significant relation at any time between a court's citing to the slippery
slope principle and its finding of no fair use.
Figure 8: Twenty-Opinion Moving Average of the
Proportion of Opinions Citing Various
Fourth Factor Propositions of Law
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Ultimately, the paradox of the fourth factor is that it is everything
in the fair use test and thus nothing. To assert, as a descriptive matter,
that it is the most important factor-or, as a normative matter, that it
235 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (citations omit-
ted) (omission in original) (quoting NIMMER, supra note 137, § 13.05 [A] [4]).
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is too important2 3 6 -_s meaningless, primarily because it is no factor,
no independent variable, at all. Instead, regardless ot what we might
hope-or fear-it would be, the actual doctrine of the fourth factor
consists in practice of a few propositions of law that judges should
keep in mind as they synthesize the various factual findings that they
have made under the previous factors-and 93.6% of the opinions
analyzed the factors in their numerical order. In theory, section 107
instructs courts to conduct a balancing test along the four dimensions
of its factors, "in light," explains Campbell, "of the purposes of copy-
right. 23 7 In practice, judges appear to apply section 107 in the form
of a cognitively more familiar two-sided balancing test in which they
weigh the strength of the defendant's justification for its use, as that
justification has been developed in the first three factors, against the
impact of that use on the incentives of the plaintiff.2ss Factor four
provides the analytical space for this balancing test to occur, and the
various doctrinal propositions under factor four are merely there to
tilt the scales one way or the other. In essence, like the four factors
themselves, they are not legal propositions, but policy propositions.
V. CONCLUSION
At a general level, this Article has sought to show that the leading
cases approach to our fair use case law is fundamentally flawed-both
as a descriptive and as a prescriptive enterprise. It is flawed as a de-
scriptive enterprise in that it fails accurately to represent the actual
state of our fair use doctrine as that doctrine is applied in the courts.
236 As Leval noted,
Although the market factor is significant, the Supreme Court has somewhat
overstated its importance. When the secondary use does substantially inter-
fere with the market for the copyrighted work, as was the case in [Harper &
Row], this factor powerfully opposes a finding of fair use. But the inverse does
not follow. The fact that the secondary use does not harm the market for the
original gives no assurance that the secondary use is justified. Thus, notwith-
standing the importance of the market factor, especially when the market is
impaired by the secondary use, it should not overshadow the requirement of
justification under the first factor, without which there can be no fair use.
Leval, supra note 93, at 1124 (footnote omitted).
237 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578.
2 See generally Wendy J. Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use:
Commodification and Market Perspectives, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 149
(Neil W. Netanel & Niva Elkin-Koren eds., 2002) (applying tort law concepts of excuse
and justification to fair use doctrine).
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Its anecdotal method is unequal to the task of accounting for a com-
plex system consisting of a multitude ofjudges, cases, and lines of doc-
trine. More importantly, but more subtly, the leading cases method is
flawed as a prescriptive enterprise in that it perpetuates-because it
requires-the myth that nonleading cases follow the leading cases. It
is one thing to learn that academic scholarship has little apparent im-
pact on the mass of our fair use case law, 2 9 but it is something else en-
tirely to learn that Supreme Court and renowned circuit court opin-
ions do not necessarily have much of an impact either. We cannot
hope to better the true state of our fair use doctrine-the doctrine as
it is practiced in the courts-if we continue to assume that conven-
tionally agreed upon leading cases carry prescriptive force.
At a more specific level, this Article has sought to induce, albeit se-
lectively and critically, a set of salutary doctrinal practices in the area
of fair use. If this empirical precedent deserves any degree of defer-
ence, if it should itself carry any prescriptive force, it is not because it
comes from a higher court, but because it represents what mostjudges
who have applied fair use doctrine have seen fit to do. The assump-
tion that the Article has made in this regard, and certainly one that is
open to criticism, is that we may trust a population ofjudges over time
systematically to point the way to the better practice of the doctrine.
It appears that for all of their fractiousness, judges applying fair use
doctrine have done just that. Where the nonleading cases declined to
follow the leading cases, they repeatedly-and systematically-did so
in ways that expanded the scope of the fair use defense. To be sure,
the data reveal many popular practices that impair the doctrine:
courts tend to apply the factors mechanically and they sometimes
make opportunistic uses of the conflicting precedent available to
them. These are systematic failures that require intervention. Never-
theless, as a whole, the mass of nonleading cases has shown itself to be
altogether worthy of being followed.
239 One rough index of the impact of academic scholarship on the fair use case
law is the proportion of opinions that cited a law review article of any kind through the
course of their fair use analysis. Of the 7 Supreme Court opinions, 4 (or 57.1%) did
so, while 25.0% of the 88 circuit court opinions and 10.9% of the district court opin-
ions did so. However, if we exclude Judge Leval's Toward a Fair Use Standard article,
supra note 93, from this tabulation, the percentages decline to 50.0% of the Supreme
Court opinions, 14.7% (or 13 of 88) of the circuit court opinions, and 5.7% (or 12 of
211) of the district court opinions. The law review article other than Leval's cited by
the most courts was Gordon, supra note 7. Six courts cited to it.
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APPENDIX: THE COLLECTION AND CODING OF THE OPINIONS
To collect a sample of the relevant opinions, I ran the following
Lexis search in the Lexis Federal Court Cases, Combined database: copy-
right and "fair use" and 107 and date(geq (1/1/1978) and leq
(12/31/2005)). This search yielded 557 opinions. I then ran the fol-
lowing Westlaw search in the Westlaw All Federal Cases database: copy-
right & "fair use" & 107 & da(aft 1977) & da(bef 2006). This yielded
575 opinions. A research assistant then reviewed the Lexis and Wesflaw
search results to identify any opinions reported uniquely in either Lexis
or Westlaw. This review yielded a total 578 opinions from the two data-
bases. A research assistant then reviewed each of these opinions to ex-
clude those that did not involve in any way an issue of copyright fair use.
This left 327 opinions. I then read each of these opinions and ex-
cluded an additional 20 opinions as irrelevant or only marginally rele-
vant to copyright fair use. Of the 307 remaining opinions, 306 made
substantial use of the section 107 four-factor test, which I defined as any
use of the test that made reference, however briefly, to at least two test
factors. I then coded each of the opinions directly into an Excel 2003
SP2 spreadsheet according to a coding instrument consisting of 72 vari-
ables. I did the same in a new spreadsheet a second time and then
compared the two spreadsheets for errors.
The coding instrument was designed to record (1) general data
about the opinion (e.g., caption, citation, judge, venue, posture), (2)
copyright-specific data about the opinion (e.g., the extent of the court's
treatment of the fair use defense, the disposition of the defense,
whether the facts involved software, the reverse engineering of software,
and/or the Internet, whether the opinion addressed the First Amend-
ment or parody), (3) factor-specific information about the opinion
(e.g., which party the court found each factor to favor, how the court
treated certain subfactor doctrine such as transformativeness or com-
merciality), and (4) various miscellaneous data about the opinion (e.g.,
whether the court cited any law review article, whether it cited legisla-
tive history, whether it relied on industry practice).
In a third round of coding, I loaded digital versions of the 306
240opinions into Atlas.ti. I then conducted qualitative coding of each
240 For other legal scholarship employing Atlas.ti, a qualitative data analysis pro-
gram widely used in the social sciences, see, for example, ArtJipson, The Post-September
1 1th Era: Interpretations of Security and Civil Liberties in the Political Margins of the Left and
Right, 2003 J. INST. JUST. INT'L STUD. 40 (examining the attitues of political figures to-
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opinion according to a code list of 248 codes. One advantage of using
Atlas.ti is that other researchers may review the Atlas.ti hermeneutic
unit used for this study to verify each coding decision against the text
of the opinions.
The coding instrument, Excel spreadsheet, Stata data file, and At-
las.ti hermeneutic unit are available upon request from the author and
will be posted to the author's website upon publication of this Article.
ward terrorism using Atlas.ti); Ronald Weitzer, Racialized Policing: Residents' Perceptions
in Three Neighborhoods, 34 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 129, 132 (2000) (analogizing qualitative
questionnaire data using Adlas.ti).
